央美设计备考全攻略 在线下载 pdf mobi 2025 epub 电子版

暂无相关简介，正在全力查找中！

暂无相关目录，正在全力查找中！

暂无相关内容，正在全力查找中

暂无出版社相关信息，正在全力查找中！

暂无相关书籍摘录，正在全力查找中！

在线阅读地址：央美设计备考全攻略在线阅读

在线听书地址：央美设计备考全攻略在线收听

在线购买地址：央美设计备考全攻略在线购买

暂无原文赏析，正在全力查找中！

暂无其它内容！

• 作者：大熊 发布时间：2010-08-01 19:10:44

  虽然没看完，但是考试过了就不会再看了啊= =

• 作者：蛋挞 发布时间：2020-04-13 23:04:23

  艺术理论

• 作者：拆台兔兔 发布时间：2023-11-30 11:21:55

  除了岗位价值评估部分外，其他都非常抽象含糊，建议想看到读者去图书馆借吧，不要浪费钱。

• 作者：木瑶 发布时间：2013-04-10 14:02:40

  三星半，内容没有书名这么惊悚，但是提到了很高营销技巧与销售知识，如果是几年前看到的话应该非常受用，现在大部分都已经被用烂了。不过就像里面说的方式是死的，但是人是活的，任何时候学会转换思维都是有价值的，

• 作者：衛藤美彩 发布时间：2022-01-17 00:13:24

  借壳标注：吉林画报社《珍贵的回忆》。中央领导视察吉林内部发行画册。

• 作者：简单就好 发布时间：2021-10-29 21:22:51

  也算是震撼，真的有走遍所有美景的人。好羡慕，生存技能，勇气，对美好的追求，生命的多姿多彩

• 精彩书摘

  作者：Putin 发布时间：2012-12-05 12:39:30

  　"Pour us a drop of tea，" he said to Emily.

  　　"I don't know that I shall wait on such brutes，" she replied， relenting， and flourishing the teapot.

  　　"Oh，" said he， taking another piece of bread and butter， "I'm not all alone in my savageness this time."

  　　"Men are all brutes，" said Lottie， hotly， without looking up from her book.

  　　"You can tame us，" said Leslie， in mighty good humor.

  　　She did not reply. George began， in that deliberate voice that so annoyed Emily：

  　　"It does make you mad， though， to touch the fur， and not be able to grab him"-he laughed quietly.

  　　Emily moved off in disgust. Lottie opened her mouth sharply to speak， but remained silent.

  　　"I don't know，" said Leslie. "When it comes to killing it goes against the stomach."

  　　"If you can run，" said George， "you should be able to run to death. When your blood's up， you don't hang half way."

  　　"I think a man is horrible，" said Lottie， "who can tear the head off a little mite of a thing like a rabbit， after running it in torture over a field."

  　　"When he is nothing but a barbarian to begin with "said

  　　Emily.

  　　"If you began to run yourself-you'd be the same，" said

  　　George.

  　　"Why， women are cruel enough，" said Leslie， with a glance at Lottie. "Yes，" he continued， "they're cruel enough in their way"-another look， and a conucallittle smile.

  　　"Well，" said George， "what's the good finishing! If you feel Iike doing a thing-you'd better do it."

  　　……

• Paul Patton：福柯论真理的历史与政治（Foucault on the History and Politics of Truth）

  作者：梨之夜言 发布时间：2023-09-05 17:32:58

  报告题目：福柯论真理的历史与政治（Foucault on the History and Politics of Truth）

  报告人：Paul Patton澳大利亚新南威尔士大学哲学科学教授

  报告时间：2017年12月19日 14:00

  报告地点：闵行校区人文楼3102会议室

  主持人：吴冠军

  主办单位：思勉人文高等研究院

  报告人简介：

  Paul Patton教授曾任澳大利亚新南威尔士大学艺术与社会科学学院科研副院长，目前担任新南威尔士大学哲学科学教授、博士生导师，新南威尔士大学职称晋升委员会委员，澳大利亚人文科学院研究员，澳大利亚科学委员会评审专家、澳大利亚哲学研究会会员和伯克贝克人文研究所荣誉研究员。Patton教授入选《澳洲哲学家》（2011年）丛书。其主要研究领域为：当代欧陆哲学、当代社会政治哲学、尼采哲学；其它研究领域有：康德哲学、现代政治思想史、认识论和科学哲学等。主要著作有：《德勒兹式的观念：哲学、殖民化和政治》、《德勒兹与政治》等。主要编著有：《介于德勒兹和德里达之间》、《尼采、女权主义和政治理论》、《澳大利亚社会的变革》等。Patton教授还翻译了德勒兹的《差异与重复》等重要著作。

  报告简介：

  在这个讲座中，帕顿教授将勾勒福柯关于求知意志的历史论述的野心与根源。他将探索在知识的根源与真理的价值等问题上，尼采对于福柯的关键影响，以及福柯对尼采的背离。更关键的是，按照福柯后来的解释，他的这项研究的一个资源，是在马克思主义进路之外，寻求另一种处理关于知识与社会关系两者之间关系的进路。所以，当福柯找到尼采哲学的一些面向有益于其研究，他和尼采之间亦有着最重要的差异。福柯归根结底，是要强调在知识主体与社会中，真理的诸种冲突性的和暴力性的根源。福柯集中地依赖权力的战争模型（并于后期放弃了该模型），而没有采取尼采对于人类驱力以及这些驱力同权力的关系的更为全面的理解。

  演讲全文：

  听译 白梨之

  It's a great pleasure and honor to be here, especially to see so many people. What I wanted to talk about is a rather specialized aspect of Foucault, and I apologize for that, but I will try and put it into a slightly broader context. One of the things that has happened in Foucault's study, the study of Foucault's work in recent years, is the publication of all his lectures from the Collège de France. This is the ten years of public lectures that he gave from 1971 until just before his death in 1984. These are now all published in French and I think almost all translated into English. I've written a little bit about some of these lectures and argued that they constitute a whole new corpus of Foucault's work. In the past, people used to say that Foucault's work could be divided into the books that he published and the many interviews that he gave, which were often a way of commenting, particularly commenting on the political significance of his work. But now, in addition to the books and the interviews, we have these lectures that he gave. These are an independent body of text that intersect in some ways with the published work, but they also contain a lot of material that never made its way into publication.

  很高兴也很荣幸来到这里，尤其是看到这么多人。我想谈的是福柯的一个相当专业的方面，对此我表示歉意，但我会尝试把它放到一个稍微宽泛的背景中。近年来，福柯研究、福柯著作研究中发生的一件事，就是出版了他在法兰西学院的所有演讲。这是他从1971年到1984年去世前的十年公开演讲。这些演讲现在都以法文出版，我想几乎都翻译成了英文。我曾写过一些关于这些演讲的文章，并认为它们构成了福柯作品的全新语料库。过去，人们常说福柯的作品可以分为他出版的书籍和他接受的许多访谈，这些访谈通常是一种评论方式，尤其是对其作品政治意义的评论。但现在，除了书籍和访谈，我们还有他的这些演讲。这些都是独立的文本，在某些方面与已出版的作品有交集，但也包含了许多从未发表的材料。

  So I think they're interesting partly because they expose details and elements of Foucault's thinking that were not widely available before. Just to give one example, I've been particularly focused on the lectures that he gave in the late 1970s. This was after the period in which he published the best known works, The Discipline and Punish on the Birth of the Prison and the History of Sexuality, Volume 1, which were the basis of the Foucault that's widely known, particularly in the social sciences and the humanities, the Foucault of power and knowledge from the early to mid-1970s. But then in the years following that, he gave three courses that did a number of things. They completely revised his understanding of an approach to power. They introduced new topics, thinking about government and forms of state, which he hadn't written about before. And the example that I want to give is the notion of governmentality that is often associated with Foucault's work in this period. There was one lecture on governmentality from 1978 that was translated quite early into Italian and then into English. And this became the basis for a whole sub-discipline of so-called governmentality studies, not just in Foucault studies but in politics and social science.

  因此，我认为它们之所以有趣，部分原因在于它们揭示了福柯思想中的一些细节和元素，而这些细节和元素以前并不广为人知。举个例子，我一直特别关注他在 20 世纪 70 年代末的演讲。在那之后，他出版了最著名的作品《规训与惩罚：监狱的诞生》和《性史》第一卷，这两本书是广为人知的福柯的基础，尤其是在社会科学和人文科学领域，也就是20世纪70年代早期到中期的权力与知识的福柯。但在那之后的几年里，他开设了三门课程，做了很多事情。这三门课程彻底改变了他对权力方法的理解。这些课程引入了新的主题，对治理性和国家形式进行了思考，这是他之前没有写过的。我想举出的例子是"治理性"这一概念，它通常与福柯在这一时期的工作联系在一起。1978 年有一篇关于治理性的演讲，很早就被翻译成意大利文，然后又被翻译成英文。这成为了所谓治理性研究的整个分支学科的基础，不仅在福柯研究领域，在政治和社会科学领域也是如此。

  But all of this based on one lecture. So now we have the complete lecture series from which that lecture came, the 1978 lectures on security, territory, population, and the lectures the following year dealing with liberal and neoliberal governmentality. So this is just one example of the way that the previous understandings of Foucault, I think, can be greatly developed and expanded because of these lecture materials. So my topic today, however, focuses on an earlier period in Foucault's work. So it's particularly a discussion provoked by the publication of the first series of Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France, which were published under the title "Lectures on the Will to Know," which is not what he called them at the time, but at the time he called them in French simply "The Will to Know," "La Volonté de Savoir," but then he subsequently wrote that little introduction to a history of sexuality and gave the same title, "La Volonté de Savoir," to the "History of Sexuality," Volume 1. So these lectures, which were among the last to be published, were given this new title, "Lectures on the Will to Know."

  但所有这些都是基于一次讲座。因此，我们现在有了该讲座的完整系列讲座，1978 年关于安全、领土、人口的讲座，以及次年关于自由主义和新自由主义治理性的讲座。因此，这只是一个例子，我认为正是因为有了这些讲座资料，我们才能极大地发展和拓展之前对福柯的理解。不过，我今天的主题侧重于福柯早期的作品。福柯在法兰西学院（Collège de France）的第一辑讲座出版后引发了一场讨论，这些讲座以"关于求知意志的讲座"为题出版，但他当时并不这么称呼这些讲座，他当时用法文称这些讲座为 "求知意志"，"La Volonté de Savoir"，但后来他又写了性史导论，并给《性史》第一卷起了同样的题目"La Volonté de Savoir"。因此，这些讲座，也是最后出版的讲座之一，被冠以《求知意志》的新书名。

  They were one of the last volumes to be published because it was only at a certain point a few years later that recordings were made of those lectures. Initially it was people attending who brought their own tape recorders, but then the Collège de France itself started recording the lectures. So for the later years, there were not only Foucault's lecture notes and scribbles, but there was also a complete recording of the lectures given. That wasn't the case at the beginning. So this first year of lectures in 1971-72, all that the editors had to rely on were Foucault's own lecture notes, and there were some problems with those, which I'll save it more about. What I'm focused on especially is this question that Foucault introduces in these lectures called the idea of what he calls variously a "history of the will to know" or a "history of the will to truth."

  它们是最后出版的几卷之一，因为直到几年后的某一时刻，这些讲座才被录制下来。最初是参加者自带录音机，后来法兰西学院自己开始录制讲座。因此，在后来的几年里，不仅有福柯的演讲笔记和涂鸦，还有完整的演讲录音。而最初的情况并非如此。因此，在1971-72 年的第一年讲座中，编辑们只能依靠福柯自己的讲稿，而这些讲稿存在一些问题，我将在后面详细介绍。我特别关注的是福柯在这些讲座中提出的问题，即他所谓的 "求知意志的历史 "或 "求真意志的历史"。

  It involves particularly his relation to Nietzsche. In later years, Foucault never actually published that much on Nietzsche's thought and philosophy. He published a couple of small essays on Nietzsche. But in one of the last interviews he gave, he described himself as Nietzschean. He said that in all his work, he tried to work with or work in the shadow of Nietzsche's philosophy. There's quite a bit about Nietzsche in this early lecture series. It's the Nietzschean language that he uses in talking about a history of the will to know or a history of the will to truth, which basically comes down to the idea of writing a history of truth. It's one of the themes that runs through a lot of his work that follows. Even in a book like Discipline and Punish, you find passages where Foucault talks about the examination not only as a disciplinary mechanism for examining and recording populations or subjects or prison populations, but also, he says, a mechanism for the production of knowledge. He contrasts the kind of social science that emerged in the 19th century in Europe with earlier forms of knowledge which had different mechanisms.

  这尤其涉及他与尼采的关系。在晚年，福柯实际上从未发表过那么多关于尼采思想和哲学的文章。他发表过几篇关于尼采的小论文。但在他最后接受的一次采访中，他自称是尼采主义者。他说，在他的所有作品中，他都试图在尼采哲学的阴影下工作。在这个早期系列讲座中，有不少关于尼采的内容。他在谈到 "求知意志的历史 "或 "求真意志的历史 "时使用了尼采式的语言，这基本上可以归结为 "书写一部真理史 "的观点。这也是贯穿他之后许多作品的主题之一。即使是在《规训与惩罚》这样的书中，你也能找到福柯谈论考试的段落，他说考试不仅是一种规训机制，用于检查和记录人口或主体或监狱人口，而且也是一种知识生产机制。他将 19 世纪在欧洲出现的社会科学与早期的知识形式进行了对比，后者具有不同的机制。

  The one that he refers to in relation to 16th and 17th century natural science was the inquiry. Or in the History of Sexuality, Volume 1, he talks about the ritual of confession as it developed in the Christian church as one of the rituals and one of the mechanisms by which and through which knowledge of sexuality developed. So this concern with the techniques and the kinds of knowledge that were produced and considered to be, in some cases, true is a recurrent theme of all this work. And it's this theme that he introduces in these lectures on the Will to Know, the 1971-72 lectures. And it's in this context, and I'll talk more about this, he talks about Nietzsche and Nietzsche's conception of knowledge and Nietzsche's attitude toward truth. So what I've put on this first slide are simply the primary texts that I'm talking about. And these are the 1971-72 lectures on the Will to Know. Foucault's inaugural lecture, which was given apparently a couple of weeks before his first public lecture in 1971. This is the little text that's published in English under the title "The Order of Discourse" or in the American version "The Discourse on Language". And then prior to that, two other works, the "Archaeology of Knowledge", what I put are the dates of original publication in French, not the dates of the translation.

  他提到的与 16 和 17 世纪自然科学有关的是探究。或者在《性史》第一卷中，他谈到了在基督教会中发展起来的忏悔仪式，认为它是性知识得以发展的仪式和机制之一。因此，这种对所产生的、在某些情况下被认为是真实的知识的技术和种类的关注，是所有这些著作中反复出现的主题。他在 1971-72 年关于"求知意志"的讲座中介绍的就是这个主题。正是在这样的背景下，我还会进一步谈到，他谈到了尼采和尼采的知识观，以及尼采对真理的态度。因此，我在第一张幻灯片上放的只是我所谈论的主要文本。这些是1971-72年关于"求知意志"的演讲。福柯的就职演讲，显然是在他1971年首次公开演讲的几周前发表的。这篇小文章的英文版标题是《话语的秩序》，美国译本则译为《语言的话语》。在此之前，还有两本著作，《知识考古学》，我写的是法文原版出版的日期，而不是翻译的日期。

  So the "Archaeology", published in French in 1969, and before that a work that was a long response to questions to him, put to him by the epistemology circle at the École Normale Supérieure, which is on again the archaeology of the sciences. And then a final text, which was a series of lectures that he gave in Brazil in 1973 called "Truth and Juridical Forms", which has been available for a while in English and is reproduced in the third volume of the "Essential Works" of Foucault. So EW3, that refers to "Essential Works", volume three. And the first point that I want to make about this is that the way in which Foucault approached this project of a history of the Will to Know, or history of the Will to Truth, was really a development of what he had already written about and theorized in his earlier work on what became known as the "Archaeology of Knowledge". And this started in the late 60s as a series of really methodological reflections on the way in which Foucault approached the history of certain kinds of empirical knowledge. And this is particularly with reference to his earlier book "The Order of Things", as it's called in English, "Les Maux et les Chose" in French, which was the one that introduced Foucault as a supposedly structuralist theorist of the history of sciences or proto-sciences.

  1969年出版了法文版的《知识考古学》，在此之前的一部著作是对高等师范学院认识论小组向他提出的问题的长篇回应，再次论述了科学的考古学。最后一篇文章是他于 1973 年在巴西发表的系列讲座，名为《真理与司法形式》，这篇文章的英文版已经出版了一段时间，并被收录在福柯《基本著作》的第三卷中。所以，EW3，指的是《基本著作》第三卷。关于这一点，我想说的第一点是，福柯处理这个"求知意志史 "或 "求真意志史"项目的方式，实际上是对他早先在被称为 "知识考古学"的著作中所写的内容和理论的发展。这部著作始于上世纪 60 年代末，是福柯对某些经验知识的历史研究方法进行的一系列真正的方法论反思。这尤其是参考了他早先的著作《词与物》（英文名为 "The Order of Things"，法文名为"Les Maux et les Chose"），正是这本书将福柯介绍为科学史或原科学史的结构主义理论家。

  And in that book he focused on knowledge of language, of living things, and of economic knowledge in the period from the 16th, really, to the 19th century, and introduced well-known ideas about the notion of an episteme or an underlying systematicity of knowledge and the idea of ruptures in the forms of episteme or the forms of underlying system that governed empirical knowledge in those fields. So these methodological reflections, which led to the "Archaeology of Knowledge", he tries to theorize what he had previously been doing as what he called an approach to the history of discourse. So, you know, as opposed to the history of science as it had been traditionally practiced or the history of ideas, Foucault developed what he called a history of discourse. And the "Archaeology of Knowledge" is, above all, an attempt to theorize and specify just what he meant by discourse. And another relevant detail, when he was appointed to the chair at the College de France, professors are entitled to make up their own name for the chair that they hold.

  在那本书中，他重点研究了从 16 世纪，实际上，到 19 世纪的语言知识、生物知识和经济知识，并提出了众所周知的知识型或知识的基本系统性，以及认识论形式或支配这些领域经验知识的基本系统形式的断裂。因此，这些方法论反思引出了"知识考古学"，他试图将自己之前一直在做的事情理论化，成为他所谓的话语史方法。因此，相对于传统的科学史或思想史，福柯提出了他所谓的话语史。而《知识考古学》，首先就是试图理论化和明确他所说的话语的含义。另一个相关的细节是，当他被任命为法兰西学院的教席时，教授们有权为自己担任的教席起自己的名字。

  And the name that Foucault gave to his chair was "Professor of the History of Systems of Discourse". So, in these early methodological reflections, he contrasts two ways of thinking about knowledge. He contrasts the history of science approach that would try to retrace the modifications, the permutations of knowledge in a given field, with his own approach, which he described as trying to identify the underlying discursive formations that enabled the emergence of new kinds of knowledge or new contents in a given field, biology, economy, theories of language. And in this early text on the "Archaeology of the Sciences", the response, which was a long response that he prepared to written questions from the epistemology circle, and which was published in 1968. In this response, he distinguished two approaches, or as he put it, two heteromorphous systems that might be considered conditions of possibility of a given science.

  福柯给自己的教席起的名字是 "话语体系史教授"。因此，在这些早期的方法论思考中，他对比了两种思考知识的方法。他将科学史的方法与他自己的方法进行了对比，前者试图追溯特定领域中知识的变迁和变化，而后者则试图找出使特定领域（生物学、经济学、语言理论）中新型知识或新内容得以出现的基本话语形式。在这篇关于"科学考古学"的早期文章中，他对认识论圈子提出的书面问题做了长篇回应，并于 1968 年发表。在这份答复中，他区分了两种方法，或者用他的话说，两种可以被视为特定科学可能性条件的异构系统。

  The first system, he says, was internal to the science in question that involved, as he put it, the formal and semantic rules that determine whether a statement belongs to the science in question. These are what he refers to here as conditions of scientificity or conditions of being a scientific statement, that he says define the conditions of the science as a science. So that's one way, and that is the typical approach of historians of science, particularly in the French tradition of historical philosophers of science. The second system that he talks about is the one that he says is concerned not with these internal conditions of possibility, but rather, as he says, the possibility of a science in its historical existence. And this involves the conditions that define the discursive formation on the basis of which a science could emerge. And what he, in his detailed account of what he means by discursive formation, it includes things like the domain of objects, the kind of objects that are discussed, the concepts developed, the kinds of statement it uses, and so on.

  他说，第一个系统是有关科学的内部系统，如他所说，它涉及形式和语义规则，这些规则决定了一个陈述是否属于有关科学。这些就是他在这里所说的科学性条件或作为科学陈述的条件，他说这些条件界定了科学之为科学的条件。这就是第一种方法，也是科学史学者的典型方法，尤其是法国科学史哲学家的传统。他所说的第二种体系关注的不是这些内在的可能性条件，而是他所说的科学在其历史存在中的可能性。这涉及到界定话语形成的条件，在此基础上，科学才有可能出现。在他对话语形成的含义的详细阐述中，它包括诸如对象的领域、讨论对象的种类、形成的概念、使用的陈述种类等等。

  And the speaking position of those who utter the statements. And the study of these conditions, these discursive conditions, as he says, involved the field of its actual history rather than simply science in the successive displacement of its internal structures. And this distinction then is one that he draws in the response to the epistemology circle in 1968. A lot of that text then found its way into the Archaeology of Knowledge that was published in French the following year in 1969. And here in the book, the distinction between these two ways of looking at the conditions of possibility of knowledge, empirical knowledge, took the form of a terminological distinction between the two words that are used in French to describe knowledge, savoir and connaissance. And this is a footnote that he added to the English translation of the Archaeology of Knowledge because in French he just used the two words, but they always pose a problem for English translators because both of them can be translated by knowledge.

  以及发表言论者的发言立场。对这些条件、这些话语条件的研究，正如他所说的那样，涉及到其实际历史的领域，而不仅仅是其内部结构连续变迁中的科学。他在1968年对认识论圈子的回应中就做出了这样的区分。1969年，《知识考古学》以法文出版。在书中，这两种看待知识、经验知识可能性条件的方式之间的区别，以法语中用来描述知识的两个词savoir和connaissance之间的术语区别的形式出现。这是他在英译本《知识考古学》中添加的脚注，因为在法文中他只是使用了这两个词，但这两个词总是给英文翻译者带来麻烦，因为这两个词都可以译为 "知识"。

  And this is Foucault's gloss for the translator. He says, "By connaissance, I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it, whereas savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated." So savoir here corresponds to what he means by discourse, connaissance corresponds to what he means by a science considered in its internal aspect. So in these terms, then, the kinds of knowledge that he discussed in the Order of Things, the early modern knowledge of language, of economic processes and living beings, would be instances of connaissance established on the basis of the savoir that characterized what he called there the classical episteme. So the elements that identify a particular discursive formation, such as the rules in accordance with which it formed objects, concepts, and particular kinds of statement, were defined as the savoir, as he said in the Archaeology of Knowledge, that was indispensable to the constitution of a science, although not necessarily destined to give rise to one.

  这是福柯给译者的解释。他说："所谓connaissance，我指的是主体与客体的关系以及支配这种关系的形式规则，而savoir指的是在特定时期，这种或那种客体被赋予connaissance以及这种或那种阐释被制定出来的必要条件。" 因此，这里的savoir对应于他所说的话语，connaissance对应于他所说的从内在方面考虑的科学。因此，用这些术语来说，他在《词与物》中讨论的各种知识，即现代早期关于语言、经济过程和生物的知识，都是在他称之为古典认识论的"savoir"基础上建立起来的"connaissance"的实例。因此，正如他在《知识考古学》一书中所说的那样，确定特定话语形式的要素，如形成对象、概念和特定类型的陈述所依据的规则，被定义为构成一门科学所不可或缺的"savoir"，尽管不一定会产生一门科学。

  So this is what he means by talking about discourse and systems of discourse as conditions of possibility of a science, but that need not necessarily give birth to a science or lead to the development of science. So in the Archaeology, the definition that he gives of discursive formations in terms of these different elements, objects, kinds of statement, concepts, enable him to develop, to distinguish different thresholds of complexity that in turn correspond to the different approaches to the history of science and different ways of considering the distinction between truth and error or falsity that is implied in any science. So that's just background on Foucault's Archaeology. It wasn't until his inaugural lecture at the College de France in 1970, December of 1970, that he began to talk about the history of systems of discourse or savoir as a history of the will to know, or more simply as a history of truth. And it's notable that when one looks at this text, the inaugural lecture, the Order of Discourse for Discourse on Languages, it's called, he talks about will to knowledge and will to truth almost interchangeably.

  因此，这就是他所说的话语和话语体系是科学的可能性条件，但并不一定会产生科学或导致科学的发展。因此，在《知识考古学》中，他根据这些不同的元素、对象、陈述种类、概念对话语形式所下的定义，使他能够发展、区分不同的复杂性阈限，而这些阈限又对应于科学史的不同研究方法，以及考虑任何科学中隐含的真理与谬误或虚假之间区别的不同方式。以上只是福柯考古学的背景。直到1970年12月，福柯在法兰西学院的就职演说中，才开始将话语体系史或知识（savoir）史作为一部"求知意志史"，或者更简单地说，作为一部"真理史"。值得注意的是，当我们阅读这篇文稿，即开幕演讲，也就是所谓的《话语的秩序/语言的话语》时，他几乎是交替地谈论求知意志和求真意志。

  So he doesn't distinguish them in that text, although as we'll see in the lecture course that followed, he does make a distinction. And a further issue that emerged only in the course of the lectures concerned, I mean, one thing was these methodological reflections and Foucault's ways of writing the history of systems of discourse. Another issue that emerged in the lectures was his concern with the different philosophical conceptions of knowledge, the understandings of knowledge that we find in the history of philosophy. And as Foucault wants to say, the manner in which these philosophical conceptions of knowledge represent the will to know or the Western will to knowledge. And it's only at this point when he begins to talk in the lectures about these philosophical representations of the will to know that he begins to talk explicitly about Nietzsche and Nietzsche's views on truth and knowledge. So my general claim at the outset is that this externalist, this archaeological history of knowledge that became the history or as he put it in the inaugural lecture, the morphology of the will to know, was developed largely independently of any reference to Nietzsche or any discussion of Nietzsche in Foucault's published work.

  因此，他并没有在该文本中将它们区分开来，尽管我们会在随后的讲座课程中看到，他确实做出了区分。还有一个问题是在讲座过程中才出现的，我是说，一个问题是这些方法论反思和福柯书写话语体系史的方式。讲座中出现的另一个问题是他对不同的哲学知识概念的关注，即我们在哲学史中发现的对知识的理解。正如福柯想说的那样，这些知识的哲学概念代表了西方的知识意志。而只有到了这个时候，当他开始在演讲中谈论这些对知识意志的哲学表述时，他才开始明确地谈论尼采以及尼采对真理和知识的看法。因此，我一开始的总体主张是，这种外在主义的、考古学的知识史，即成为历史的知识史，或如他在开篇演讲中所说的，求知意志的形态学，在福柯出版的著作中基本上是独立于对尼采的任何提及或对尼采的任何讨论而发展起来的。

  It's true that he had long been a reader of Nietzsche and sometime teacher of Nietzsche's philosophy. But in this lecture course, the lectures on the will to know, he devoted one whole lecture and part of another to the discussion of Nietzsche and Nietzsche's views on truth and knowledge. And he reused some of this material in a lecture in Canada, in Montreal, later in the year, in 1971. And again in these lectures in Rio de Janeiro in 1973, the lectures published under the title "Truth in Juridical Form". So the issue that I mentioned earlier about the lectures, the lectures on the will to know, is that the actual texts, because they were reconstructed from Foucault's lecture notes by his literary executor and former partner Daniel Dufayre. And Dufayre points out that the lecture on Nietzsche from the course was missing, it was no longer in the folder. So they assumed that he had taken this and used it as the basis for the Montreal lecture later in the year, which they did have. So in the publication, there is no lecture from the course itself, but they have included this lecture given in Montreal, which is the one largely devoted to Nietzsche from later in 1971.

  诚然，他长期以来一直是尼采的读者，有时也是尼采哲学的教师。但在这堂关于"求知意志"的讲座课程中，他用了整整一堂课和另一堂课的一部分来讨论尼采以及尼采关于真理和知识的观点。1971年晚些时候，他在加拿大蒙特利尔的一次讲座中再次使用了其中的一些材料。1973年，他在里约热内卢的演讲中再次使用了这些材料，这些演讲以"真理与司法形式"为题出版。因此，我之前提到的关于这些讲座、关于求知意志的讲座的问题是，这些讲座的实际文本是由福柯的文学遗嘱执行人和前合伙人丹尼尔·德菲尔根据福柯的讲座笔记重建的。德菲尔指出，课程中关于尼采的讲义不见了，不在文件夹里。因此，他们推测他把这篇讲稿作为基础，在当年晚些时候发表了蒙特利尔讲稿，而他们确实有这篇讲稿。因此，在这本出版物中，并没有课程本身的讲义，但他们收录了在蒙特利尔的这篇讲义，也就是 1971 年晚些时候主要讲尼采的那篇讲义。

  No lecture from the course itself, but they have included this lecture given in Montreal, which is the one largely devoted to Nietzsche from later in 1971. So, and what I want to suggest, I want to look at some of this material a little bit more closely, in order to suggest that Nietzsche's relation, I mean Foucault's relation to Nietzsche is somewhat disjointed, that it's not a comprehensive or particularly rigorous study of Nietzsche's views on knowledge and truth. It's rather, there are other lectures in which Foucault clearly found some passages in Nietzsche that were helpful, and in particular helpful for the distinction that he later drew between the will to know and the will to truth. And others that were useful for this larger project of an external or as it became more explicitly a political history of truth. But there were also many gaps and discrepancies between his own approach to these issues and Nietzsche's. So, to say a little bit more about the content of this first lecture series, in the inaugural lecture in December 1970, the Order of Discourse, Foucault suggested that for the first time that the distinction between truth and falsehood, or truth and falsity, might be regarded as one of the systems of exclusion, as he called them, that defines the order of discourse in modern Western society.

  这门课本身没有讲稿，但他们收录了这篇在蒙特利尔发表的讲稿，主要是1971年晚些时候关于尼采的讲稿。所以，我想说的是，我想更仔细地研究一下其中的一些材料，以说明尼采的关系，我是说福柯与尼采的关系有些脱节，这不是对尼采关于知识和真理的观点的全面或特别严谨的研究。相反，在其他一些讲座中，福柯明显发现尼采的一些段落很有帮助，尤其是对他后来区分求知意志和求真意志很有帮助。还有一些段落对这一更大的外部项目或更明确的真理政治史项目很有帮助。但在他自己处理这些问题的方法与尼采的方法之间，也存在着许多差距和差异。在1970年12月的首场讲座《话语的秩序》中，福柯首次提出，真与假、或真与假之间的区别可以被视为他所说的排斥系统之一，它界定了现代西方社会的话语秩序。

  So in that lecture, he talks about, he introduces the topic of discourse and the order of discourse by saying in Western societies, there is an order of discourse and it has these exclusions, like the distinction between reason and madness, between sanity and insanity. And this was, after all, the topic of his first big book, The History of Madness, which was Foucault's thesis and first book published in French and long translated into English, only in a much reduced and accepted version called Madness and Civilization. It's only two or three years ago that the complete text of The History of Madness has also been translated. But in that book, he's very much concerned with the contrast between reason and unreason, as he called it, or reason and madness. And suggested there, one of the arguments of that book is that that distinction, particularly as it emerged from the 17th century onwards, becomes one of the great systems of exclusion, one of the boundaries of the order of discourse.

  在那场演讲中，他谈到了话语和话语秩序的话题，他说，在西方社会，有一种话语秩序，它有这些排斥，比如理性与疯狂的区分，理智与疯癫的区分。毕竟，这是他的第一本大书《古典时代疯狂史》的主题，这是福柯的毕业论文，也是他用法文出版的第一本书，长期以来一直被翻译成英文，只是版本大为缩减并被接受，译为《疯癫与文明》。直到两三年前，《古典时代疯狂史》的全文才被翻译出来。但在那本书中，他非常关注理性与非理性（他分别称之为"理性“与”疯狂"）之间的对比。书中提出的一个论点是，这种区分，尤其是从 17 世纪开始出现的这种区分，成为一种伟大的排斥体系，成为话语秩序的界限之一。

  So, you know, the speech of unreason, the speech of the mad, insane speech is simply excluded from, it's not serious discourse and isn't read or treated as such, it's read or treated only as medical symptom, if you like. So that's one of the systems of exclusion that he talks about. The other that he refers to are the kinds of prohibition that govern who can speak about what and under what conditions. Particularly in highly charged or highly sensitive fields of politics and sexuality. And alongside those, then he adds the distinction between truth and falsehood. And he acknowledges in that lecture the apparent implausibility of suggesting that the constraints on true discourse were of the same order as those other apparently arbitrary, contingent and variable systems of exclusion. And he says at one point, quoting Foucault, certainly at the level of individual propositions within a given discourse, he says the division between the true and false is not arbitrary, nor modifiable, nor institutional, nor violent. But here, you know, it's not arbitrary, modifiable, institutional, violent at the level of individual propositions.

  所以，你知道，非理性的言论、疯狂的言论、疯癫的言论根本就被排除在外，不被视为严肃的话语，也不会被当作严肃的话语来阅读或对待，如果你愿意的话，它只会被当作医学症状来阅读或对待。这就是他所说的排斥体系之一。他提到的另一个系统是那些规定谁可以在什么条件下谈论什么话题的禁令。尤其是在政治和性等高度紧张或高度敏感的领域。除此以外，他还提到了真理与谬误之间的区分。他在演讲中承认，认为对真实话语的限制与其他那些显然是任意的、偶然的和可变的排斥体系具有相同的秩序，显然是难以置信的。用福柯的话说，在特定话语中的个别命题层面上，真假之间的划分并不是任意的，也不是可修改的，不是制度性的，也不是暴力性的。但在这里，你知道，在单个命题的层面上，它不是任意的、可修改的、制度化的、暴力的。

  So he's saying that, you know, within a given system of discourse, within a given science, we have a, we can have a rigorous and clear cut distinction, a motivated distinction between truth and falsehood. But he goes on to say, and this is the quote, "If we pose the question at another level, not in respect of individual propositions, but in relation to," quoting him, "the will to truth that has survived across so many centuries of European history, if we ask what has been in its most general form the kind of division that has governed our will to know, then we can indeed identify something like a system of exclusion." And the examples that he goes on to give in this lecture are things like the difference, he goes back to ancient Greece, the difference, he says, between what counted as truth in the discourse of the Greek poets, the great authors of the Greek tragedies in the sixth century BC, and what counted as truth for Plato and others a century later.

  因此，他的意思是说，你知道，在特定的话语体系中，在特定的科学中，我们可以对真理和谬误进行严格而清晰的区分，进行有动机的区分。但他接着说，引述如下："如果我们在另一个层面上提出这个问题，不是针对个别命题，而是联系"，引述他的话，"在欧洲历史上延续了这么多世纪的求真意志，如果我们问一下，在其最一般的形式中，支配我们求知意志的那种划分是什么，那么我们确实可以找出类似于排斥体系的东西"。他在讲座中继续举出的例子包括，他追溯到古希腊，他说，在公元前六世纪的希腊诗人、希腊悲剧的伟大作者的话语中，什么算作真理，与一个世纪后柏拉图和其他人认为的真理之间存在着差异。

  In the first case, he says, truth was assured by the fact that a discourse was spoken by one who had the right to do so, that it was uttered in accordance with the appropriate rituals. That's the truth in the discourse of the poets. In the second case, Plato and the more rational, rationalist thinkers of fifth century Greece, truth was dependent, he says, on the proposition itself, meaning its form and its relation to its object. So he says in the inaugural lecture, "Between Hesiod and Plato, a new division of the will to knowledge emerged, true discourse was no longer precious and desirable because it was no longer tied to the exercise of power." That, of course, that idea of true discourse, rational or scientific discourse, is not tied to the exercise of power, is an idea that he comes to radically revise later in the mid-1970s. And he goes on to talk about other modifications in the Western will to truth.

  他说，在第一种情况下，真理的保证是，话语是由有权这样做的人说出的，是按照适当的仪式说出的。这就是诗人话语中的真理。在第二种情况下，柏拉图和五世纪希腊更理性的理性主义思想家认为，真理取决于命题本身，即命题的形式及其与对象的关系。因此，他在就职演讲中说："在赫西俄德和柏拉图之间，出现了一种新的求知意志的划分，真正的话语不再珍贵和可取，因为它不再与权力的行使联系在一起。"当然，真实话语、理性或科学话语与权力的行使并不挂钩，这是他后来在20世纪70年代中期从根本上修正的观点。他接着谈到了西方求真意志的其他修正。

  So I will skip over some of these, but the discontinuities that he talks about in the order of things, when he talks about the ruptures in the knowledge of language of living beings and economics that occurred at the end of the 16th century and then again at the end of the 18th and 19th, these breaks or ruptures in the episteme of knowledge, these are the kind of examples he gives of modifications in the will to know. So in the end of that lecture, he talks about these historical modifications as cuts or breaks in the morphology of our will to know. And he says, "It's as though from Plato onwards the will to truth had its own history, which was not that of constraining truths, but that of the history of fields of objects to be known, the history of the functions and positions of the knowing subject, the history of the material, technical, and instrumental investments of knowledge." So, and all of those things, objects to be known, functions and positions of the knowing subject, these are the criteria that he uses to identify different bodies or formations of discourse.

  因此，我将略过其中的一些，但当他谈到 16 世纪末发生的生物语言和经济学知识的断裂，以及 18 世纪末和 19 世纪末再次发生的知识型的断裂时，他所谈到的事物的秩序中的不连续性，就是他所举的求知意志发生改变的例子。因此，在讲座的最后，他把这些历史性的变化说成是我们的求知意志在形态上的切割或断裂。他说："就好像从柏拉图开始，真理意志就有了自己的历史，这不是限制真理的历史，而是被认识对象领域的历史，是认识主体的功能和地位的历史，是知识的物质、技术和工具投资的历史"。因此，所有这些东西，被认识的对象、认识主体的功能和地位，都是他用来识别不同的话语体或话语形式的标准

  So when he says that the will to truth had its history and its history is these modifications at the level of discourse, he's suggesting that, in effect, he's suggesting that what he'd earlier described as a history of systems of discourse can now be re-described and re-presented as a history of the European Western will to know. And this is then how he presents the lectures. So I've just been talking about the inaugural lecture, which was a prelude to the lecture course itself. And the first lecture starts with this following declaration. "The Will to Know" is the title I would like to give to this year's lectures. And he says, "To tell the truth, I think I could also have given this title to most of the historical analyses I have carried out up to now." So here he is retrospectively re-describing what he had earlier described as a history of forms of knowledge or proto-sciences, or then in the methodological reflections in the archeology of knowledge as a history of systems of discourse. Now he's saying it's the history of the will to know. And he goes on, "It could also describe analyses that I would now like to undertake. I think that all of these analyses, past or still to come, could be seen as something like so many fragments for a morphology of the will to know."

  因此，当他说求真意志有它的历史，而它的历史就是这些在话语层面上的修改时，他实际上是在暗示，他早先描述的话语体系的历史，现在可以重新描述和重新表征为欧洲西方求知意志的历史。这就是他演讲的方式。所以，我刚才讲的是就职演讲，它是讲座课程本身的前奏。第一讲的开场白如下："求知意志"是我想给今年讲座起的题目。他说："说实话，我觉得我也可以给我迄今为止进行的大部分历史分析起这个题目"。因此，他在这里回顾性地重新描述了他早先所描述的知识形式史或原生科学史，或者在知识考古学的方法论反思中将其描述为话语体系史。现在，他说这是求知意志的历史。他接着说："它也可以描述我现在想要进行的分析。我认为，所有这些分析，无论是过去的还是未来的，都可以被看作是求知意志形态学的许多片段"。

  And in this context, he refers back to the suggestion in his inaugural lecture that the will to truth might be considered a system of exclusion. And here he's still using will to know and will to truth somewhat interchangeably. And he says that one of the aims of this lecture course is to see whether the will to truth is not as profoundly historical as any other system of exclusion. And he goes on to summarize the stakes of this project. He says, "The aim is to see whether, through the history of true discourses, we can bring to light the history of a certain will to the true or false, the history of the will to truth, the history of a certain will to posit the interdependent system of truth and falsity. Secondly, whether we can show that this historical, singular, and ever-renewed activation of the system of truth and falsity forms the central episode of a certain will to know peculiar to our civilization. And finally, whether we can articulate this will to know, which has taken the form of a will to truth, not on a subject or on an anonymous force, but on real systems of domination." So here you get a sense of the political ambition of this history of the will to know or historicization of the will to truth. So, and the first point in this set of aims indicates that when he speaks of the will to truth, he doesn't just mean the preference for truth or, as indeed Nietzsche often mentioned, the particular value that we attach to truth.

  在这种情况下，他又提到了他在就职演讲中的建议，即求真意志可以被视为一种排斥体系。在这里，他仍然交替使用"求知意志"和"求真意志"。他说，本讲座课程的目的之一，就是要看看求真意志是否与任何其他排斥体系一样具有深刻的历史性。他接着总结了这个项目的关键所在。他说："我们的目的是要看看，通过真实话语的历史，我们是否能够揭示某种真实或谬误的意志的历史，某种求真意志的历史，某种提出真假相互依存体系的意志的历史。其次，我们能否证明，这种历史性的、独特的和不断更新的真假体系的激发，构成了我们文明特有的某种求知意志的中心情节。最后，我们能否将这种以求真意志为形式的求知意志，不是与某个主体或某种无名的力量，而是与现实的统治体系接合起来"。因此，在这里你可以感受到这一求知意志史或求真意志历史化的政治抱负。因此，这一系列目标中的第一点表明，当他谈到求真意志时，他并不只是指对真理的偏好，或者正如尼采经常提到的，我们对真理所赋予的特殊价值。

  What Foucault means is the more fundamental will that imposes this dichotomy between truth and falsity or truth and error as the defining feature of all knowledge. And it's this that raises the question of the relation between the will to truth and the will to know in Western culture. And the picture that Foucault gives in these lectures is briefly an idea of the will to truth as a particular historical form of the will to know. So one referring back to that earlier mention of the transformation in ancient Greece in the transition from Hesiod to Plato, from the poets to the rationalist philosophers, this transition from a poetic conception of knowledge to a rationalist one is precisely what he means by an historical development of, as the transition from one to another form within the will to know.

  福柯所指的是一种更基本的意志，它将真与假或真理与谬误的二分法作为所有知识的决定性特征。正是这一点提出了西方文化中求真意志与求知意志之间的关系问题。福柯在这些演讲中所描绘的图景，简而言之就是将求真意志视为求知意志的一种特殊历史形式。因此，回溯到之前提到的古希腊从赫西俄德到柏拉图的转变，从诗人到理性主义哲学家的转变，这种从诗性的知识概念到理性主义知识概念的转变，正是他所说的历史发展，即从一种形式到另一种形式的求知意志的转变。

  So he goes on to ask whether it would be possible to write a history of the will to know and transitions, changes within it. And another example that he refers to is the exclusion of the sophists. He says it was fundamental to the conception of knowledge developed and outlined in Plato and Aristotle, which he describes as an event of knowledge savoir, which gave rise to a certain type of assertion of the truth and to a certain effect of knowledge connaissance. So he's suggesting that with Plato and particularly with Aristotle, the idea of a discourse of truth defined explicitly in opposition to the sophists and sophistry and to that practice of knowledge that was pragmatic and problem oriented in a way that sophistry was. Foucault suggests that this is another act of exclusion, if you like, and one that led to the development of a conception of knowledge that has been fundamental ever since in European culture.

  因此，他继续追问，是否有可能撰写一部关于求知意志及其过渡和变化的历史。他提到的另一个例子是对智者学派的排斥。他说这是柏拉图和亚里士多德发展和概述的知识概念的基础，他将其描述为savoir的事件，它产生了某种类型的真理主张和某种connaissance的效果。因此，他认为，在柏拉图，尤其是亚里士多德那里，真理话语的概念明确地与智者学派和雄辩术相对立，并与雄辩术那种实用主义和问题导向的知识实践相对立。福柯认为，如果你愿意，这是另一种排斥行为，它导致了一种知识概念的发展，而这种概念自此在欧洲文化中占据了根本地位。

  So he says if we accept that science had its origin within philosophical discourse and in particular within the conceptions of knowledge developed in Plato and in Aristotle, we can see what is at stake in the problem posed, i.e. Western science in its entirety can be seen as a development on the basis of this particular modification of the will to know. The act that by exclusion defined an outsider philosophical discourse and tied philosophy and truth together in a certain mode must in fact characterize our will to know. And it is this act, he says, that has to be uncovered. So, one of the particular concerns in this first lecture course then is breaking the link between knowledge and truth, because it's only on this basis that he can conceive of the will to truth as a particular historical form or modification of the will to know.

  因此，他说，如果我们承认科学起源于哲学话语，特别是起源于柏拉图和亚里士多德所形成的知识概念，我们就可以看到所提出的问题的关键所在，即整个西方科学可以被看作是在这种对求知意志的特殊改造的基础上发展起来的。通过排除界定外来哲学话语并以某种方式将哲学与真理联系在一起的行为，事实上必须是我们的求知意志的特征。他说，必须揭示的正是这种行为。因此，这第一讲课程的一个特别关注点就是打破知识与真理之间的联系，因为只有在这个基础上，他才能把求真意志设想为求知意志的一种特殊历史形式或修正

  And he's quite explicit on the need to draw this separation in the second lecture when he comments on the dilemma which can be traced to Kant, the dilemma that confronts anyone who purports to tell the truth of knowledge, as he says, from the outside. A project of this kind implies an account of the history and relativity of forms of knowledge to the historical conditions that makes them possible. And as such, it's open to the dilemma that philosophers ever since Kant routinely pose to relativist accounts of the history of knowledge. They pose the question, is this a true account? And the resulting self-contradiction, Foucault says, is inevitable unless we can get rid of the affiliation of truth and knowledge, unless knowing is not by its nature, by its destination or its origin, knowing the truth.

  他在第二讲中非常明确地指出了这种分离的必要性，他评论了可以追溯到康德的两难困境，即任何试图从外部揭示知识真理的人所面临的困境。这种计划意味着要说明知识形式的历史和相对于使其成为可能的历史条件的相对性。因此，它面临着康德以来的哲学家们经常对知识史的相对主义论述提出的困境。他们提出的问题是：这是真实的陈述吗？福柯说，由此产生的自相矛盾是不可避免的，除非我们能摆脱真理与知识的关联，除非认识在本质上、在目的或起源上不是认识真理。

  And it's this task of what he calls the de-implication of truth and knowledge that he finds in Nietzsche and that he says will serve as a guiding thread for his proposed analysis of the will to know. And the final point mentioned in that list of aims is the one that points to the complexity of his understanding between the history of the will to know and the politics of truth. So the question there, whether it's possible to articulate the will to know with social processes of struggle and domination, points to something that becomes much more important in his later work, namely the concept of power. But at this stage in this early series of lectures, he does not have a particularly developed conception of power and doesn't introduce it in any meaningful way.

  他在尼采身上发现的正是这种他所谓的去简化真理和知识的任务，他说这将成为他所提出的 求知意志分析的指导线索。他在目标清单中提到的最后一点，指出了他对求知意志的历史与真理政治之间的复杂性的理解。因此，这里的问题，即是否有可能将求知意志与斗争和统治的社会过程接合起来，指向了在他后来的作品中变得更为重要的东西，即权力的概念。但在早期系列讲座的这一阶段，他并没有一个特别成熟的权力概念，也没有以任何有意义的方式引入权力概念

  So it's clear from comments like this last one and indeed from Foucault's earlier reflections on the archaeology of knowledge that one of the sources of this project and one of the sources of this history of this idea of the history of the will to know and more generally the history of the western will to truth, is Foucault's concern with wanting to find a different way to address what had been a problem in French Marxist thought of the time, namely the problem of the relationship between knowledge and social relations. So, and he doesn't explicitly refer to this problem within Marxism as a source of his project in the lectures, but in those later 1973 lectures that he gave in Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro, the truth in juridical forms, he actually begins with this problem. He starts out by elaborating the fact that French academic Marxism, he says, suffers the very serious defect of assuming a traditional philosophical conception of the subject of knowledge as unchanged and unchanging throughout history.

  因此，从最后这番话以及福柯早先对知识考古学的反思中可以清楚地看出，这个项目的源头之一，也是求知意志史这一概念的历史，以及更广泛意义上的西方求真意志史的源头之一，是福柯希望找到一种不同的方式来解决当时法国马克思主义思想中的一个问题，即知识与社会关系之间的关系问题。因此，他在演讲中没有明确提到马克思主义中的这个问题是他的项目的来源，但在他后来于1973年在巴西里约热内卢发表的演讲《真理与司法形式》中，他实际上是从这个问题开始的。他一开始就阐述了这样一个事实：他说，法国学术界的马克思主义有一个非常严重的缺陷，那就是假定传统哲学概念中的知识主体在历史上是一成不变的。

  And on the basis of that, it conceives of social relations and economic conditions as imposed on the knowing subject, the subject of knowledge, but only in the negative form of an obstacle or an impediment to its access to truth. And here what he identifies as the problem is the Marxist concept of ideology as expressing this relationship between the subject of knowledge and the external political or economic conditions on the other hand. He says, for French academic Marxism, ideology is the mark, the stigma of these political or economic conditions of existence on a subject of knowledge who rightfully should be open to truth. And just a bit more background. Clearly what he's referring to here is the problem that was a particular focus of the Marxism of the French philosopher Louis Althusser and his colleagues at this time. So, Althusser was responsible not only for what was often called a structuralist reading of Marx, a distinction between, which turned on a distinction between the early Marx, the humanist Marx as Althusser and his colleagues referred to them, and the properly scientific Marx of the later work, the Marx of Das Kapital.

  在此基础上，它认为社会关系和经济条件是强加给认识主体、知识主体的，但只是以阻碍或妨碍其获得真理的消极形式存在。在这里，他指出的问题在于马克思主义的意识形态概念表达了知识主体与外部政治或经济条件之间的这种关系。他说，对于法国学术界的马克思主义来说，意识形态是这些政治或经济条件在知识主体身上留下的印记和烙印，而知识主体理应向真理敞开大门。再介绍一下背景。显然，他在这里所指的问题是法国哲学家路易·阿尔都塞和他的同事们当时特别关注的马克思主义问题。因此，阿尔都塞不仅要对所谓的马克思的结构主义解读负责，而且还要对早期马克思，即阿尔都塞及其同事所称的人文主义马克思，和后期著作《资本论》中正确的科学马克思之间的区别负责。

  So, Althusser's reading of Marxism relied heavily on a distinction between science, properly so called, and ideology. And the point that Foucault is making here is that the way in which that function, this concept of ideology was really a rather limited concept because it only understood the relations between the subject of knowledge and the external conditions, political, economic and social, in this negative way, i.e. as obstacles or impediments to knowledge. And as he later goes on to point out, this relies on a very traditional philosophical conception of the relationship between the human subject, the known subject and the object. And it is the conception that can be traced, as he does back to Aristotle, the idea that the subject, the human mind in and of itself, has the capacity for knowledge, properly so called, for access to truth.

  因此，阿尔都塞对马克思主义的解读，在很大程度上依赖于正确的科学与意识形态之间的区别。福柯在此提出的观点是，意识形态的功能和概念实际上是一个相当有限的概念，因为它只是以这种消极的方式来理解知识主体与外部条件（政治、经济和社会）之间的关系，即作为知识的障碍或阻碍。正如他后来指出的，这依赖于对人类主体、已知主体和客体之间关系的一种非常传统的哲学概念。这种观念可以追溯到亚里士多德，即主体、人类思维本身具有知识能力，即所谓的获取真理的能力。

  It's only interference, impediments or ideology that get in the way. And Foucault already at this stage wants to, this is in the 1973 lectures, he wants to find a different approach to show, as he puts it, that political, economic and conditions are not merely obstacles for the subject of knowledge, but as he puts it, the means by which subjects of knowledge are formed and hence our truth relations. So, and this is why for him, the history of the will to truth implies a reworking of the theory of the subject and particularly a reworking of that traditional philosophical idea that the human subject is possessed with an innate affinity with the truth, that human subjectivity, as it were, by its nature, was destined and equipped to access the reality of things in general. So Foucault's aim in these lectures, particularly the 1973 lectures, is to outline an answer to this problem of knowledge within academic Marxism. But he wants to show not only how social relations can give rise to new domains of knowledge, but also to new subjects of knowledge. So he says in those lectures, the subject of knowledge itself has a history, the relation of the subject to the object, or more clearly, he says, truth itself has a history.

  只有干扰、障碍或意识形态才是阻碍。福柯在这一阶段就已经想这样做了，这是在1973年的演讲中，他想找到一种不同的方法来表明，正如他所说的那样，政治、经济和条件不仅仅是知识主体的