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• 作者：仇维堃ᴴᵁᴺᵀ 发布时间：2021-12-21 20:51:22

  可以，没有虎头蛇尾

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• 作者：Roc 发布时间：2016-11-10 22:21:07

  还是中国人写的书的特点，东拼西凑，废话颇多。不过暂时找不到其他关于崇拜的书，所以有几个核心内容还是不错的。由于青少年成长过程中必经的自我认知和社会认同阶段，造成他们容易沉浸在包装出来的理想化偶像的形象中，因为心理投射效应，简单表达个人欲望是一种最容易达成自我满足的手段。如果在追星中无法悟出自我成长实际上要靠自身的努力，成年后就会淹没在这种单向的理想化的无接触无法证伪的暴力崇拜。双趋效应则是越感觉自悲越需要向偶像表达爱慕以满足内心空虚，接触包装的形象越多反而更让自己觉得生活不如意，最终行程恶性循环无法自拔。

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  积极的心态的确很重要，一点不鸡汤。

• 迈克尔·曼：《社会权力的来源》（第一卷）读书笔记

  作者：诚明 发布时间：2021-08-10 22:55:22

  中文版前言

  两个主要论点：① 各个社会及其发展都是社会权力四种来源的产物。区别于唯物主义和唯心主义两种传统。把军事/政治权力二分不同于韦伯。【1】② 把四种权力来源视为社会互动网络，界限是可区分的。理论兴趣可能带有欧洲中心论，即努力解释所谓“欧洲奇迹”【2】但曼认为，“欧洲奇迹”既不是独一无二的，也不是纯粹经济方面的，也没有那么多“奇迹”这个词常带有的慈善意味，有经济和政治进步的光明面，也有武力和帝国主义的黑暗面。【3】

  Preface to the new edition

  This book presents a model for explaining the development of power relations in human societies and then applies it to human prehistory and most of history too. vii. 曼简单回顾了自己的学术历程，并指出The book I initially hoped to write was intended to be mainly theoretical, albeit buttressed by three empirical case studies on the Roman Empire, feudal Europe, and contemporary societies. vii. 四卷本的写作及具体方法（viii）面对历史学家和社会学家两个方向的批评，曼回应自己为何提供的是a model而非a hard theory，也就是a way of looking at the world（ix）与韦伯的差异及学术争议（ix-xi）对“社会”的批评，沃勒斯坦的研究，强调历史没有统一性（xi）对本书的修正，重新定义军事权力，“集中的致命暴力的社会组织”而非最初的“以集中胁迫的形式组织物质力量”（So I redefined military power as the social organization of concentrated lethal violence. "Concentrated" means mobilized and focused, "lethal" means deadly. Webster defines "violence" as "exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse" or "intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive action or force." These are the senses I wish to convey: military force is focused, physical, furious, lethal violence. This is why it evokes the psychological emotion and physiological symptoms of fear, as we confront the serious possibility of agonizing pain, dismemberment, or death. xiii）政治权力，三种可能批评（xiii-xiv）使地缘政治权力的位置更加明确（xv）欧洲奇迹的解释，反对欧洲中心论的指责，修正主义者，回应佩里·安德森的批评（欧洲奇迹有两个必要的、普遍的原因。而不是一个：欧洲社会的激烈竞争涉及所有的权力的来源，但这是由基督教的规范性团结来调节的。there were two necessary, general causes of the European Miracle, not one: an intense competiveness in European society involving all the sources of power, but this was regulated by the normative solidarity of Christendom. xxi）（xvi-xxi）恩格斯问题，四种权力哪一种是决定性的？曼坚持没有一般的、单一的模式化（There seems to be no general, single patterning of these processes. xxii）

  前言

  1972年“Economic Determinism and Structural Change”论文，which purported not only to refute Karl Marx and reorganize Max Weber but also to offer the outlines of a better general theory of social stratification and social change. xxv. 历史学和社会学的相互运用。

  第一章 作为有组织的权力网络的社会（Societies as organized power networks）

  【总论】人类社会权力关系的历史和理论。【1】（The three projected volumes of this book provide a history and theory of power relations in human societies. p.1）阅读本卷的变通方法。两个概括性陈述：（1） 社会是由多重交叠和交错的社会空间的权力网络构成的。【1】（Societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power. p.1.）强调社会不是单一的，不是（封闭或开放的）社会系统，不是整体。【1】（Societies are not unitary. They are not social systems (closed or open); they are not totalities. p.1.）提及民族国家对人类科学的隐蔽影响，（民族）“文化”被赋予的优越地位，【2】曼主张完全废弃有关“社会”的概念。【3】（There is no one master concept or basic unit of "society." It may seem an odd position for a sociologist to adopt; but if I could, I would abolish the concept of "society" altogether. p.2.）（2）对社会、它们的结构和它们的历史作总体说明，最好依据这四者的相互关系，即社会权力的四个来源：意识形态的、经济的、均势的和政治的，它们是：① 交叠的社会互动网络，而不是单一社会整体的维、层次或要素；② 它们也是达到人类目标的组织、制度手段。【3】A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships. These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions, levels, or factors of a single social totality. This follows from my first statement. (2) They are also organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. Their primacy comes not from the strength of human desires for ideological, economic, military, or political satisfaction but from the particular organizational means each possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be. p.2. 曼在比较具体的、社会空间的和有组织的分析层面上进行操作，其权力史取决于估量社会空间的组织能力和解释它的发展。【3】（I operate at a more concrete, sociospatial and organizational level of analysis. p.2.… My history of power rests on measuring sociospatial capacity for organization and explaining its development. p.3.）不连续和突变。【3-4】

  【社会权力的分析】终极首要性问题，采取怀疑主义的经验主义。【5】（I take skeptical empiricism seriously. p.4.）曼从human nature开始，把理性增进对美好事物的享用而斗争看作权力的本源。【5-6】否认动机完全切合首要性问题。【6】（My conclusion will be that though motivational issues are important and interesting, they are not strictly relevant to the issue of ultimate primacy. p.5.）权力形式是显现的需求，出现在满足需求的过程中，以军事力量为例。【7-8】（For a form of power may not be an original human goal at all. If it is a powerful means to other goals, it will be sought for itself. It is an emergent need. p.6.）因此忽略原本的动机和目标，集中于显现出来的有组织的权力本源。【8】（I ignore original motivations and goals and concentrate on emergent organizational power sources. p.6.）像吉登斯一样，并不把权力本身作为手段，手段是运用权力的介质。【8】（Like Giddens I do not treat "power itself as a resource. Resources are the media through which power is exercised." p.6.）有组织的权力，集体性权力和分配性权力的辩证关系。【9】（Collective and distributive power）区分广泛性、深入性、权威性和弥散性权力：（1）

  广泛性权力

  ：涉及把分布在辽阔领土上的大量人民组织起来从事最低限度稳定合作的能力；（Extensive power refers to the ability to organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation. p.7.）（2）

  深入性权力

  ，紧密组织和指挥高水平动员或使参加者承担义务的能力；（Intensive power refers to the ability to organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from the participants, whether the area and numbers covered are great or small. p.7.）（3）

  权威性权力

  ，集团或制度以意志力造成的，由明确的命令和有意识的服从组成；【10】（Authoritative power is actually willed by groups and institutions. It comprises definite commands and conscious obedience. p.8.）（4）

  弥散性权力

  ，以一种更加本能的、无意识的、分散的方式分布于整个人口之中，导致体现权力关系但并未得到明确控制的相似的社会实践，典型地包含的是理解（实践是自然的、道德的或从不言而喻的共同利益中产生的）而非命令和服从，如世界资本主义市场，民族或阶级团结一致等。【11】（Diffused power, however, spreads in a more spontaneous, unconscious, decentered way throughout a population, resulting in similar social practices that embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded. It typically comprises, not command and obedience, but an understanding that these practices are natural or moral or result from self-evident common interest. p.8.）据此得出组织所及范围的类别。拉铁摩尔【12】借用后勤学度量权威性权力的所及限度。权威性权力需要后勤基础，弥散性权力需要普遍的基础结构。【13】（General historical sociology can thus focus on the development of collective and distributive power, measured by the development of infrastructure. Authoritative power requires a logistical infrastructure; diffused power requires a universal infrastructure. Both enable us to concentrate on an organizational analysis of power and society and to examine their sociospatial contours. p.10.）讨论了流行的分层理论，即马克思主义和新韦伯主义。接受共有前提，社会分层是权力在社会中全面的发生和分布（I am happy to accept their initial joint premise: Social stratification is the overall creation and distribution of power in society. p.10.）；但提出四类而非三类基本权力类型。【14】(suggest four, not three, fundamental types of power. p.10.)区分政治权力和军事权力的四点理由，特别是“政治权力是出自于集中化、制度化和地域性规则的权力；军事权力则是出自于在任何地方得以组织起来的有组织的物质力量的权力。”【15】（Political powers are those of centralized, institutionalized, territorial regulation; military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized. p.11.）

  【反对单一社会观】马克思理论“社会构成的层次”，新韦伯主义中“社会的维”；二者以对单一社会的抽象的、几乎是几何学式的看法为前提。【15-6】（In Marxian theory they are generally referred to as ''levels of a social formation''; in neo Weberian theory they are "dimensions of society." Both presuppose an abstract, almost geometric, view of a unitary society. pp.11-12.）优化后的帕森斯的“社会”定义：社会是一个社会互动的网络；在这一网络的边界，存在它与其环境之间的一定层次的互动的断离。【18】（A society is a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment. p.13.）但这种定义只涉及统一或模仿的度（But it concerns only degree of unity and patterning. p.13.）曼坚持反对单一社会观。人是社会性的动物而不是社会的动物，需要进入社会权力关系但不需要社会整体。【19】（Human beings need to enter into social power relations, but they do not need social totalities. They are social, but not societal, animals. p.14.）间隙出现。人类造就的不是单一社会而是多样的社会互动的交叉网络，在一定社会空间这些网络围绕四种权力来源相对稳定地形成。【21】（Human beings do not create unitary societies but a diversity of intersecting networks of social interaction. The most important of these networks form relatively stably around the four power sources in any given social space. p.16.）曼进一步指出，真正的互动的制度化网络与社会权力的理念型来源并不是一对一的关系，打破功能和组织的平衡，并承认它们的“混杂性”。【23】（Real institutionalized networks of interaction do not have a simple one-to-one relationship to the ideal-typical sources of social power from which I started. This will lead us to break down the equation of functions and organizations and to recognize their "promiscuity." p.17.）以资本主义与国家的关系为例，“发达资本主义国家不是政治现象也不是经济现象：它们同时是两者。”【23】（Advanced capitalist states are not political rather than economic phenomena: They are both, simultaneously. p.17.）曼的解决方法是依据权力组织（These point to a solution in terms of power organization. p.18.）以欧洲长矛方阵兴起，文明化的文化和宗教的兴起为例。【24-9】

  【权力的四种来源和组织】

  1. 意识形态权力。

  三个相关论证：我们不能凭直接感受认识世界，需要关于意义的概念和范畴；规范对持久的社会合作必不可少，垄断规范是通向权力之路；审美或仪式惯例，它们并非理性科学的。【30】（Ideological power derives from three interrelated arguments in the sociological tradition. p.22.）反对意识形态权力是虚假的。两种意识形态组织类型：

  （1）比较自主的形式，在社会空间上是超越的，超越了现存制度并产生了神圣的权威形式，后者脱离并凌驾于世俗权威结构之上，依靠弥散性权力。宗教。【31】more autonomous form it is sociospatially transcendent. It transcends the existing institutions of ideological, economic, military, and political power and generates a "sacred" form of authority (in Durkheim's sense), set apart from and above more secular authority structures. It develops a powerful autonomous role when emergent properties of social life create the possibility of greater cooperation or exploitation that transcend the organizational reach of secular authorities. Technically, therefore, ideological organizations may be unusually dependent on what I called diffused power techniques, and therefore boosted by the extension of such ''universal infrastructures'' as literacy, coinage, and markets. p.23.

  （2）在强化内举行、信任并因而增强已确立的社会集团权力的过程中作为内在士气的意识形态，它大大巩固着存在着的东西，较少自主性。【32】The second configuration is ideology as immanent morale, as intensifying the cohesion, the confidence, and, therefore, the power of an alreadyestablished social group. Immanent ideology is less dramatically autonomous in its impact, for it largely strengthens whatever is there. p.24.

  2. 经济权力。

  经济权力是从满足生存需要中得来的，这种满足是通过提取、改造、分配和消费自然物的社会组织实现的，围绕这些任务形成的集合即阶级（曼在纯粹经济的意义上运用这一概念）【32】Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature. A grouping formed around these tasks is called a class - which in this work, therefore, is purely an economic concept. p.24.使用阶级表示纯粹的经济权力集团，以社会分层化表示任何类型的权力分配，统治阶级表示经济经济。【33】经济组织是由生产、分配、交换和消费的环网组成的，广泛亦深入实践的日常劳动，提供了广泛性与深入性权力、弥散性和权威性权力的稳定的、社会空间的特有混合，曼称为实践环网。【33-4】Economic organization comprises circuits of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption. Its main sociospatial peculiarity is that although those circuits are extensive, they also involve the intensive practical, everyday labor - what Marx called the praxis - of the mass of the population. Economic organization thus offers a distinctively stable, sociospatial blend of extensive and intensive power, and of diffused and authoritative power. Therefore, I shall call economic organization circuits of praxis. p.25.

  3. 军事权力。

  来自有组织的外界防卫需要和对侵略的有用性。关系生死，以及在广大地理和社会空间的方位和攻击组织，所以具有深度和广度的方方面面，垄断它的军事精英能得到集体和个体权力。【34】（Military power was partly defined earlier. It derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggression. It has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns questions of life and death, as well as the organization of defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces. Those who monopolize it, as military elites, can obtain collective and distributive power. pp.25-6.）从根本上，军事权力是集中强制的，动员暴力；【34】（Military organization is essentially concentrated-coercive. It mobilizes violence, the most concentrated, if bluntest, instrument of human power. p.26.）具有比较广泛的有效范围，负面的、恐怖主义的形式。【35】（military power also has a more extensive reach, of a negative, terroristic form. p.26.）曼认为军事权力在社会空间是二元的，一个是在其中可以行使明确的强制性控制的集中核心，周围则是广泛的阴影，受威胁但不受明确控制。【35】（military power is sociospatially dual: a concentrated core in which positive, coerced controls can be exercised, surrounded by an extensive penumbra in which terrorized populations will not normally step beyond certain niceties of compliance but whose behavior cannot be positively controlled. p.26.）

  4. 政治权力。

  政治权力来自对社会关系许多方面的集权化、制度化和领土化管理的有效性，曼把它限定在受中央支配并且有领土界限的管理和强制（即国家权力）【35】Political power …derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations. p.26. 相对其他三种权力，政治权力涉及特定区域，位于“中心”，并向外起作用，必定是中央集权和地域性的。【35-6】（political relations concern one particular area, the "center." Political power is located in that center and exercised outward. Political power is necessarily centralized and territorial, and in these respects differs from the other power sources. p.27.）地缘政治外交：两种类型，霸权帝国统治边疆居民和毗邻的附庸，以及多国文明的各种不同形式。【36】

  曼界定的主要形式是超越的或内在的（意识形态权力的）、实践环网的（经济的）、集中强制的（军事的）以及领土集中和地缘政治外交的（政治的）组织，这样的结构是‘混杂’的，吸收和构成来自社会生活许多领域的因素。【37】[The main shapes I identified were transcendent or immanent (from ideological power), circuits of praxis (economic), concentrated-coercive (military), and centralized-territorial and geopolitical diplomatic (political) organization. Such configurations become what I called "promiscuous," drawing in and structuring elements from many areas of social life. p.28.] 总体模型（pp.29.）经验逐一检验必须是历史主义的。【39】

  第二章 一般社会进化的结束：史前人如何躲避权力（The end of general social evolution: how prehistoric peoples evaded power）

  权力史的开端，曼回溯史前时代，“在真正的起点，既不存在权力，也不存在历史。”【46】 in the true beginnings there was neither power nor history. p.34. 进化论的史话，后者的承认人类进化是由于它保持了统一的事实而区别于其他物种。【48】（Human evolution has differed from the evolution of other species by the very fact that it has retained its unity. p.35.）曼对这种单一史话表达异议。在概述史前史后，检讨了四种类型的进化论，即自由主义的、功利主义的、马克思主义的和军事主义的。在曼看来，“文明的出现并不是史前社会一般属性的派生物。”【99】（The emergence of civilization was not an outgrowth of the general properties of prehistoric societies. p.73.）“这一构造的历史并不是社会分层或国家进化的历史。”【90】（this constructed history is not one of the evolution of social stratification or the state. p.67.）事实上，“除了早期等级社会，定居下来的新时期社会，没有发生任何普遍的社会进化。”【94】（No general social evolution occurred beyond the rank societies of early, settled neolithic societies. We must now move to local history. pp.69-70.）

  第三章 美索不达米亚的分层、国家和多种权力行为者文明的出现（The emergence of stratification, states, and multi-power-actor civilization in Mesopotamia）

  文明的出现，连同社会分层和国家的伴生特征是摹制的。【99】不能精确界定“文明”，认为集中于文明的单一假定特征会陷入困境。【99】（We can never exactly define what we mean by "civilization." The word has too much resonance, and the prehistoric and historic record is too varied. If we focus on a single supposed characteristic of civilization, we get into difficulties. p.73.）这种含混显然比不上沃格林的洞察。在曼看来，“文明、分层和国家的出现，是冲击农业对于环绕它的其余所存在的多种多样、交叠的社会互动网络促进的结果。它促进了对冲积层与内陆之间互动的进一步的幽闭，导致了文明、分层和国家的强化——但此时是作为交叠的权力网络得到强化，具体体现为永久性的强制性权力。”【105】（It suggests that civilization, stratification, and the state emerged as the result of the impetus given by alluvial agriculture to diverse, overlapping networks of social interaction present in the region surrounding it. This encouraged further caging interaction between alluvium and hinterlands, leading to intensification of civilization, stratification, and the state - now, however, intensified as overlapping power networks, embodying permanent, coercive power. p.77.）方法论上的困难，美索不达米亚的案例。【105以下】批评魏特夫，强调米索不达米亚能动的发展依赖于交叠权力网络的社会模式，它是多种权力运作着的文明而非一元的。【136-7】（The dynamic development depended on these overlaps, not to have been a product of some endogenous dynamic analogous to that outlined by Wittfogel. Mesopotamia was not unitary but a multi-power-actor civilization. p.102.）

  第四章 对分层、国家和多种权力行为者文明出现的比较分析（A comparative analysis of the emergence of stratification, states, and multi-power-actor civilizations）

  这一章考察了印度河流域和中国的案例，米诺斯文化，以及两个美洲事例，比较它们与美索不达米亚的异同。曼总结了通向文明、分层和国家的支配性路径，强调文明是一种反常现象。无论是国家还是分层都不是在现存有系统的“社会”里面内生而成的，它们的发生，（1）是出于松散交叠的史前社会网络，这些网络融合成了一个网络，即冲击农业，这种农业例外地受到了禁闭；（2）是在它与若干周边网络的互动之中，出现了进一步的禁闭机制，制约它们全都更深地卷入两层权力关系，即在地方国家范围内的权力关系和在更广泛文明范围内的权力关系。【172】Neither state nor social stratification originated endogenously, from within the bosom of existing, systemic "societies." They originated because (1) out of the loose, overlapping social networks of prehistory emerged one network, alluvial agriculture, that was unusually caged, and (2) in its interactions with several peripheral networks, further caging mechanisms appeared that constrained them all toward greater involvement on two levels of power relations, those within the local state and those within the broader civilization. p.127.

  第五章 最初的支配性帝国：强制性合作的辩证法（The first empires of domination: the dialectics of compulsory cooperation）

  此社会进步作为另一个地区互动过程的结果而更加显著、单一且广泛，军事组织的刺激，半周边地区成为文明的新核心，考察近东文明的发展。【128】a further phase of the early history of civilization. Now the social cage became more pronounced, more singular, and much more extensive as a result of another regional interaction process. This time the initial stimulus was less from economic than from military organization. And the resulting geopolitical pattern also shifted. What had been hitherto semiperipheral areas became, in a sense, the new core of civilization. "Marcher lords" were the pioneers of hegemonic empire. p.130. 强制性合作的权力技术，权力的“最重要的边际”离开了多权力运作者文明而移向支配性帝国。【179】Through the power techniques of compulsory cooperation, the "leading edge" of power shifted away from multi-power-actor civilizations to empires of domination. p.130. 曼从军事权力切入，借用（斯宾塞）的“强制性合作”（不同于拉铁摩尔模式），反对自由主义国家观，提出（1）帝国主义国家有助于在五个方面造就积累过程：军事平定、军事乘数效应、靠命令为经济物品强加价值、通过强制的劳动强化、通过征服传播和交换技术，五个经济过程同时起作用（意识形态权力的双重作用【218-9】）（2）分散化来自这些国家协助之过程的进一步发展，而不是来自对“最初的”分散化权力的再次维护；国家分裂了，促进着分散化的私有财产权的发展。【201】(1) The imperial state helped create accumulation processes in five specific ways. (2) Decentralization resulted from the further development of these state-assisted processes, not from the reassertion of an "original" decentralized power; the state fragmented, fostering the development of private, decentralized property power. .148.……Five economic processes were at the same time functional for the development of collective power yet also imposed by repression. They were military pacification, the military multiplier, the authoritative imposition of value upon economic goods, the intensification of labor through coercion, and the diffusion and exchange of techniques through conquest. Although the militarism of imperial states certainly had its negative side, when effectively and stably imposed through these five processes, it could lead to general economic development. p.148. 曼总结道，中东早期帝国的组织能力和政治专制形式主要来自发展中的军事权力关系的改组力量，集中化的强制作为社会组织的一种手段变得异常有效，“强制合作”导致经济发展的进一步突破，意识形态在统治集团内部的进一步的内在性传播，以及帝国和统治阶级的长期统一；而非魏特夫的灌溉农业需要说，决定性的生态北京是冲积层和穷乡僻壤在边地贵族地域的交叉。不过帝国仍是比较脆弱的互动网络，缺乏对臣民的强有力控制。【235】（I have shown that the organizational capacity and the politically despotic form of the first empires in the Middle East emerged primarily from the reorganizing powers of developing military power relations. Concentrated coercion became unusually effective as a means of social organization.… This led to a further burst of economic development, to a further immanent diffusion of ideological power within the dominant groups, and to the long-term consolidation of the empire and a ruling class.… The empire, however, was still a relatively fragile interaction network lacking intense control over its subjects. p.174.）

  第六章 “印欧人”与铁器：扩张中的多元化权力网络（''Indo-Europeans'' and iron: expanding, diversified power networks）

  公元前第二千纪战车驾驭者的军事统治，前第一千纪早期铁制武器和工具的传播；两个挑战的相似处：起源于北方，非定居民族，无读写的部族。曼从两个方面说明野蛮状态和灾难的“突现”：（1）近东赋予不断扩展的地理区域以及该地域所包含之多种权力网络的最初促进因素；（2）随之而来的该地域交叠、交叉的权力互动范围的发展。【242】 (1) the initial stimulus given by the Near East to a steadily widening geographical area and to the diverse power networks contained there and (2) a subsequent growth in the extent of overlapping, intersecting power interactions within this area. p.179. 曼指出，现代西方作为其继承者的最早文明的主要特征是，从地缘政治上来说它是多中心的、国际都市式的并且是非霸权的。它有三个生态之根：近东的得到灌溉的河谷和有限的耕地，陆上帝国的核心；欧洲比较开放、广泛的耕地；还有与之相连的内海。这样的生态并列在世界上是独一无二的；按照世界历史的说法，它所引发的文明也是独一无二的。【255】The first major peculiarity of the civilization to which the modem West is heir was that it was geopolitically multicentered, cosmopolitan, and non-hegemonic. It had three ecological roots: irrigated river valleys and confined plow lands, the core of the land empires of the Near East; more open, extensive plowlands in Europe; and the inland seas that connected them. The juxtaposition of such ecologies was unique in the world; therefore, in world-historical terms, so was the civilization to which it gave rise. p.189.

  第一章 腓尼基人和希腊人：分散化的多种权力行为者文明

  这一章讨论公元前第一千纪两个主要的分散化文明的出现和发展，即腓尼基和希腊。“这两个部族对于社会权力发展的巨大贡献，应归因于其文明分散化、多层次的性质，它们适合于利用它们所在地区的边缘政治的、军事的、经济的遗产，特别是居统治地位的近东帝国遗留下来的那些东西。”【257】（I argue that the massive contributions of both peoples to the development of social power is to be attributed to the decentralized, multi-level nature of their civilizations, appropriate for taking advantage of the geopolitical, military, and economic legacy of their region, especially that bequeathed by the Near Eastern empires of domination. p.190.）两个主要的辩证关系：（1）这些文明是一个宏观历史过程的组成部分；依赖于已经确立的支配性帝国的边地的分散化多种权力行为者文明，就能够利用这些帝国的成功和制度的严格性，“通过间隙出现”，并且建立它们的自治的权力组织，不过经长时间成功的权力发展过程后它们自己的组织就变得制度化和严格化了，这时它们有容易受新的依赖于其边地的支配性帝国的伤害。【257】（the possibility that these civilizations were part of a macrohistorical process. In this case, decentralized multi-power-actor civilizations lying on the marches of established empires of domination exploited the success plus the institutional rigidity of those empires to "emerge interstitially" and establish their own autonomous power organizations. After a long, successful process of power development, however, their own organizations became institutionalized and rigid. Now they become vulnerable in their tum to new empires of domination lying on their marches. Such a process can be traced in the first millennium B.C. The extent to which it was, indeed, part of a macrohistorical process will be left to the concluding chapter. p.190.）（2）中间时期。希腊社会的发展被解释为三个权力网络的发展和互动（民主的城邦；分权化和联盟性的多国体系；外向的意识形态【302-7】），居中这是多国地缘政治组织和语言文化，居外者是有关人类整体的不完全的和犹豫的概念；同时，这些圆圈中前两者的参与性和民主性使得民众实践和阶级斗争的辩证关系发挥作用，阶级具有了历史重组的能力。【257-8】The second dialectic concerns that "middle period" of developmental success. It has two principal aspects. Greek social development will be interpreted, first, as the growth and interaction of three power networks, this time not so much overlapping as arranged in concentric rings - the smallest one being the city-state; the middle one, the multistate geopolitical organization and linguistic culture we know as Greece; and the outer one, a partial and hesitant conception of humanity as a whole. At the same time the participatory, democratic nature of the first two of these rings also brought another dialectic into play: popular praxis and class struggle. Classes became capable of a historical reorganization that has reverberated ever since. p.190. 权力边界不一致包含的矛盾，“阶级型”关系，上层阶级垄断经济和均势手段并使之集中化。【307】一方面，城邦国家的政治自治及其经济繁荣，意识形态生活表面看也是如此，尽管上层阶级的文化反映和强调的是弱化城邦传统的民主内聚力；另一方面，小的城邦国家正窒息军事权力关系的潜能，重装步兵削弱传统公民军队的生存力，这需要更集权化的协调，亦弱化了城邦的内部民主制，战争费用上涨，不摧毁政治和阶级结构就不能轻易对武装力量进行中央协调，具有更广泛组织化的命令主义国家能做到这一点。【308-9】

  第八章 复兴的支配性帝国：亚述和波斯（Revitalized empires of domination: Assyria and Persia）

  与希腊相对的另一极是复兴的支配性帝国，曼在这一章考察了亚述和波斯。回顾第五章考察的古代帝国的四种主要统治策略：通过被征服的精英；军队；军事化经济的“强制性合作”；普及的上层阶级文化。铁犁出现和地方性贸易、货币和读写的扩大，倾向于分化经济发展的方向，使得强制性合作不那么具有生产性和吸引力；世界主义促进了更广泛的阶级文化同一性的普及，这种同一性也可用作一种统治工具。【314】（In Chapter 5, I set out the four main strategies of rule for the ancient empire: to rule through conquered elites; to rule through the army; or to move toward a higher level of power, through a mixture of the ''compulsory cooperation'' of a militarized economy and the beginnings of a diffused upper-class culture. On the one hand, the coming of the iron plow and the expansion of local trade, coinage, and literacy tended to decentralize the direction of economic development, making compulsory cooperation somewhat less productive and less attractive as a strategy. On the other hand, the growing cosmopolitan character of these processes facilitated the diffusion of broader class-cultural identities that could also be used as an instrument of rule. p.231.）两个帝国统治策略的不同：亚述人通过军队的统治和一定程度的强制合作同他们自身核心的普及的上层阶级的“民族主义”结合和在一起；波斯人通过被征服精英的统治同更广泛、更普遍化的上层阶级文化相结合。【314】（The ruling strategies of the two empires differed within these broad bounds and possibilities. By and large, the Assyrians combined ruling through the army and a degree of compulsory cooperation with a diffused upper-class "nationalism" of their own core. The Persians, coming later into a more cosmopolitan arena, combined ruling through conquered elites with a broader, more universalized upper-class culture. The difference is another sign that, whatever their broad similarities, empires of domination nonetheless differed considerably according to both local and world-historical circumstances. Power resources, especially ideological ones, were developing considerably in the first millennium B.C. First Assyria, then Persia, and finally Alexander the Great and his Hellenistic successors were able to extend the infrastructure of imperial and class rule. p.231.）希腊城邦很好代表了保守主义-社会主义的理想？曼说的无非是古代人的自由。【335】他认为这种观念更容易在使用铁制农具和武器的农耕者和商人中传播。希腊的发展和矛盾以不同的方式重现并在意大利半岛造成不同的结果，即罗马帝国，它既是征服者，亦是希腊主义的吸收者，是第一个成为领土性帝国而不是支配性帝国的国家。【337】（The fact that Near Eastern empires were now Greek shifted westward the center of geopolitical power. But on its own western fringes the Greek world encountered different forces. What I described as traditional Greek "conservative-socialist'' notions of freedom could spread more easily among peasant cultivators and traders with iron tools and weapons. Greek developments and contradictions were replayed in different forms and with a different outcome on the Italian peninsula. The result was the Roman Empire - the most developed example of Spencer's compulsory cooperation ever seen under preindustrial conditions, the conqueror and yet also the absorber of Hellenism, and the first to become a territorial empire rather than an empire of domination. p.247-8.）

  第九章 罗马人的领土型帝国（The Roman territorial empire）

  诸征服者最成功的随从。曼认为，这一支配性帝国最终成为领土性帝国，其权力基础结构基本上是二元的，优化并扩展着早期帝国权力发展的两个主要冲击力：（1）军团经济，强制合作的有组织的权力；（2）把阶级文化的命令式权力发展到使所有被征服的精英都能融入罗马统治阶级之中的程度。前者是罗马权力等级制的分配形式，后者是横向的、集体的形式，二者的结合使罗马人获得和保持。【340】I will argue that this empire of domination eventually became a true territorial empire, or at least had about as high a level and intensity of territorial control as could be attained within the logistical constraints imposed on all agrarian societies. Its power had a fundamentally twofold base, refining and extending the two principal thrusts of power development of earlier empires. First it developed a form of the organized power of compulsory cooperation, to which I will apply the label of the legionary economy. Second it developed the authoritative power of class culture to the point where all conquered elites could be absorbed into the Roman ruling class. The first was the major hierarchical, distributive form of Roman power; the second, the major horizontal, collective form. Through their conjunction, what Rome acquired, Rome kept. p.250. 曼强调军团的重要性，其成就的主要原因是动员经济、政治以及一度动员意识形态承诺的能力，而非纯粹的军事组织。【400】The core Roman institution was always the legion. Yet the legion was never a purely military organization. Its ability to mobilize economic, political, and, for a time, ideological commitments was the main reason for its unparalleled success. p.295. 精英文化是排他的且最终是内向型的。【403】军团经济并非灵活的工具。世界性宗教的意识形态权力。【404】

  第十章 超越性意识形态：基督教信徒世界（Ideology transcendent: the Christian ecumene）

  亚述和波斯丢过中作为内在精神和士气的意识形态，通过意识形态权力的基础结构（沟通系统、教育和生活方式）形成的国家和统治阶级的凝聚力，口头的而非书面的；文明发轫期的超越性权力的意识形态。这一章考察罗马帝国后期两种意识形态权力之间的“竞争”：意识形态强化罗马统治阶级内在的士气；单量另一方面表现为基督教的超越性权力，弥散性而非权威性的权力，冲突与妥协。【410】This chapter presents evidence of a "competition" between the two configurations of ideological power in the later Roman Empire. On the one hand, ideology solidified the immanent morale of the Roman ruling class. But, on the other, it appeared as the transcendent power of Christianity - what I shall call the Christian ecumene. This was innovative, combining extensive and intensive power, largely of a diffuse rather than an authoritative kind, which spread throughout all the major classes of an extensive society. p,301. 印度教是迄今为止人类所经历的意识形态权力的顶峰。【411】（Hinduism represents the pinnacle of the powers of ideology in human experience to date. p.302.）基督教解决帝国矛盾的失败。【456-7】未能摆脱普遍性和特殊性的对子（to deal with particularisms and universalism alike, we must tum to that empire. p.303.）曼把宗教看作意识形态权力是一种非常别扭的做法，他写就的是权力史而非秩序史，神的位置是被清除了的，余下的只是人的世界，或者说现代人的世界，这是一种过于狭隘的视野。

  第十一章 世界宗教的比较：儒教、伊斯兰教，（尤其是）印度种姓[A comparative excursus into the world religions: Confucianism, Islam, and (especially) Hindu caste]

  这一章考察了其他世界宗教，包括儒教、伊斯兰教和印度教等。孔子哲学基本上是保守主义的，儒教的作用基本上是振奋精神。它不引入任何超越性意识形态原则。【465】（the fundamental conservatism of Confucius's philosophy. Being a denial of transcendent salvation, it is equally a denial of radical politics and of what we call "religion." But for this reason it is the true Durkheimian "religion": Society, as it is, is the sacred. Confucianism's role is thus largely one of morale boosting; it introduces no principles of ideological transcendence. p.342-3.）曼对儒家的理解偏差巨大，注释部分显示是依据韦伯研究的结果。最后对这两章进行总结。“中国缺乏世界主义”【501】超越性宗教权力概念是从基督和圣保罗、穆罕默德、婆罗门以及佛陀时代的人及其门徒为依据提出的，并使其稍微世俗化，能包括早期文明的文化，结果是意识形态权力概念虽不是一般性的意识形态理论，但也许能够反映意识形态的实际历史作用。【501】 I slightly secularize it to include the more worldly flavor of the early civilizational cultures - plus the possibility of analyzing modem ideologies (like liberalism or Marxism) in similar terms. The result is my notion of ideological power-based less on general properties of societies than on a few opportunities presented by the world-historical development of power. It is not much of a general theory of ideology, but it may reflect the real historical role of ideologies. p.371.

  第十二章 欧洲的动态发展（一）：深入阶段，800至1155年[The European dynamic: I. The intensive phase, A.D. 800-1155]

  中世纪欧洲拥有的且有助于它走向工业资本主义的运动及其根源（发展动力）。【506】（The subject matter of this chapter is that dynamism and its origins, the motor of development that medieval Europe pos sessed and that helped it move toward industrial capitalism. p.373.）19世纪中期的资本主义革命或工业革命，这种转变由公元1150年前后的两个阶段组成：第一阶段，经济实践的深入性权力加速发展；第二阶段，商品流通的广泛性权力增长；第一阶段是第二阶段的前提，也是转变的原始基础。第十二章论述第一阶段。【506-7】[My argument is that the transition included two phases before and after about A.D. 1150. The first saw acceleration largely of intensive powers of economic praxis, the second accompanied it with growth of the extensive power of commodity circuits, slow at first and accelerating by about 1500. The first was a precondition of the second and was the original ground of the transition. It is the subject matter of this chapter, with the growth in extensive power reserved for the next two. p.374.] 对资本主义生产方式的定义：商品生产；生产手段的私人垄断占有；劳动是自由的，是脱离生产工具的。【507】早期欧洲社会结构是传统的，封建生产方式被定义为地主阶级通过地租方式从依附农民那里榨取剩余劳动。曼提出，为解释这一转变需要提出两个问题：所有权是如何变成个人的和绝对的？劳动是如何变成商品的？【508】（How did ownership become individual and absolute? How did labor become a commodity? p.375.）不能把这种具体的经济转变等同于欧洲历史的整体运动，资本主义生产方式是理念型，是一种抽象。曼认为，为了阐释资本主义（以及封建主义）的兴起，必须追溯所有四种权力组织的相互关系。【508】“欧洲的运动进程不是从封建主义向资本主义的转变。”【509】（The process of European dynamism is not the transition from feudalism to capitalism. p.376.）下两章证明“欧洲社会的终点状态，即资本主义和工业主义，也是一系列支离破碎的民族社会互动网络，即一种国际性的多国之间的地缘政治、外交网络。我们要阐释欧洲的结构或运动，就必须分析相互竞争、大体平等的民族国家的兴起。反之，我们也会发现，它们在一定程度上，甚至基本上是军事权力关系的发展所导致的组织改造的产物。”【509】（the end state of European society, as well as being capitalism and industrialism, has also been a segmentary series of national networks of social interaction, that is, an international multistate geopolitical, diplomatic network. We cannot explain European structure or dynamism without an analysis of the rise of competitive, roughly equal, national states. In tum, we shall find that they were partly, perhaps even largely, products of reorganizations induced by the development of military power relations. p.376.）这一章由四种权力切入考察中世纪。“基督教这一规范体系作为资本主义发生的一个因素一直受到忽视”；【510-1】（Christianity as a normative system has been neglected as a causal factor in the emergence of capitalism. p.377.）动力作用的时间提前到公元800年前要素就位，1000年动力作用显露。曼反对欧洲“超过”亚洲的时间晚至1450或1500年为转折点的看法，而认为1500年前欧洲在广泛性权力方面经常处于劣势，但在深入性方面于1000年时就已处于领先地位。【512】（Europe was often inferior, and never superior, in extensive powers until after 1500. But as we shall see, in another range of power achievements, intensive ones, especially in agriculture, Europe was leaping ahead by A.D. 1000. p.378.）曼把封建主义看作意识形态、军事/政治和经济权力的多重互动网络，并指出“任何一个集团都不能垄断权力；相反地，所有的权利参与者都有自主的领域。”【536】No single group could monopolize power; conversely, all power actors had autonomous spheres. p.397. 资本主义私人产权的兴起，曼拆分为两个问题：少数人如何在不断变化的环境中保持私人资源最终成为“资本家”，大众如何丧失财产权最终成为失去土地的劳动者？国家的兴起不是与资本主义的兴起相对立的，而是用单一的、排他的所有权消灭复杂的、特殊的义务的过程中的一个必要因素。【539】（First, it is not a matter of how people acquired their own private resources from more communal "feudal" institutions, but rather a matter of how a few preserved them through changing circumstances - to appear eventually as "capitalists" - and of how the mass of the population lost their property rights to appear eventually as landless laborers. Second, the rise of the state was not antithetical to the rise of capitalism, but a necessary element in the elimination of multiple, particularistic obligations by unitary, exclusive ownership. p.399.）曼总结道：中世纪向资本主义发展的动力主要归因于这一结构的两个方面：（1）权力网络的多元性和缺少对它们的垄断控制，使得中世纪各社会集团具有很大程度的地方自主性；（2）尽管基督教世界本身分裂为作为统治阶级内在士气的意识形态和更超越的、非阶级的意识形态，但由于它提供了广泛性网络和规范和平，那些地方集团就可以安全地活动。这种自相矛盾的地方主义并没有窒息扩张主义的外倾取向，而是采取了剧烈的、有控制的、阶级分裂的竞争形式。在他看来，“地方主义和扩张主义的矛盾，阶级冲突、竞争和秩序的矛盾，是理解这个时代发明活动的活力的关键所在。”【555-6】Medieval dynamism, which primarily took the form of a drive toward capitalist development, was mainly attributable to two aspects of this structure. Frist, the multiplicity of power networks and the absence of monopolistic control over them conferred a large degree of local autonomy on medieval social groups. Second, these local groups could operate safely within the extensive networks and normative pacification provided by Christendom, even though Christendom was itself split between being an immanent ideology of ruling-class morale and a more transcendent, classless ideology. Thus paradoxically localism did not stifle an outward, expansionist orientation, but took the form of intense, regulated, class-riven competition. … These paradoxes of localism and expansionism and of class conflict, competition, and order are the crux of the dynamism of the inventions of the age. p.412.

  第十三章 欧洲的的动态发展（二）：协调性国家的兴起，1155至1477（The European dynamic: II. The rise of coordinating states, 1155-1477）

  从12世纪晚期，群龙无首的联盟开始逐渐崩溃，到1845年秀权力网络成为一系列彼此分立但各自相对统一的网络并拓展到全球，即民族国家及其殖民地和势力范围。曼认为有两个重要阶段：（1）一种经济、军事和意识形态的混合力量把一批“协调”的中央集权的领土型国家推到显要地位；（a mixture of economic, military, and ideological forces pushed into prominence a set of "co-ordinated," centralized, territorial states. p.416.）（2）以领土为中心的关系开始具有一种有机的形式，其中国家成为一个统治阶级的权力集中的组织者。【562】these territorially centered relationships began to take an "organic" form in which the state was the centralized orga- nizer of a ruling class. p.416. 这一章考察第一阶段，曼的基本观点是：欧洲的动态发展（首先是经济上的）造成了一系列新兴的间隙性互动网络，因此特别需要一种中央集权的领土型的组织形式。在欧洲的竞争结构中，有些国家碰上了这种机遇，从而强盛起来。这些中央集权的领土型国家的权力得到增强。【562-3】My most general argument can be expressed in terms of the model of Chapter 1. European dynamism, now primarily economic, threw up a number of emergent interstitial networks of interaction for which a form of organization that was centralized and territorial was distinctly useful. In the competitive structure of Europe, some states lit upon this solution and prospered. There the power of the state, centralized and territorial, was enhanced. p.416. 以英国财政记录为材料分析国家的兴起，国家财政主要履行对外军事功能，但这种由军事支配的国家发展的内涵要比“国家军事职能”理论更复杂。【580】（It was predominantly fulfilling external military functions; and the growth in the financial size of the state at both current and constant prices was a product of the growing costs of war. p.430.）（1）民族国家的出现，12世纪早期因果人民并不是一个有意义的社会学整体，【580】13和14世纪某些地区的人逐渐“民族化”【582】14世纪末英语的广泛使用。【597-8】（2）广泛性权力和协调性国家的成长。曼总结道，“随着封建欧洲的原初动力变得愈益具有广泛性，资本主义和民族国家形成了一种松散的但协调而集中的联盟，这一联盟随即将深入和征服天国和人间。”【600】（As the original dynamism of feudal Europe became more extensive, capitalism and the national state formed a loose but coordinated and concentrated alliance, which was shortly to intensify and to conquer both heaven and earth. p.446.）

  第十四章 欧洲的动态发展（三）：国际资本主义与有机的民族国家，1477至1760年（The European dynamic: III. International capitalism and organic national states, 1477-17 60）

  简要回溯，第十二章侧重地方的、深入性的封建发展运动，尤其是经济发展；第十三章扩大视野，集中考察更广泛的权力关系，尤其是国家的作用；欧洲的历史发展是二者的集合。这一章考察工业革命前夕这种结合的发生过程，侧重广度而非深度发展，尤其重视国家的作用，英国的情况。【607】（Chapter 12 concentrated on the local, intensive feudal dynamic, especially on its economic dynamic. Chapter 13 moved outward (as Europe itself did), focusing on more extensive power relations, especially on the role of the state. Overall, European development was a combination of the two. In the present chapter we see the combination emerge up to the Industrial Revolution. The chapter deals more with extensive than intensive aspects of development, and especially with the role of the state. p.450.）继续使用英国的国家财政作为国家功能的显示器；【608】“16世纪和17世纪国家发展的重要性主要不在于它的整个规模，而在于它作为阶级-民族的载体的作用不断增大。它的规模依然很小。”【639】（the significance of the development of the state in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries lies less in its overall bulk than in its growing role as the locus of the class-nation. It was still tiny in size. p.475.总结，论述了工业主义的资本主义基础和民族基础的相互渗透，批评以前界定的资本主义生产方式纯粹是经济抽象，现实的资本主义需要其他权力特别是均势和政治权力为条件，且本身就包含着这些权力。具体而言，除了生产以外，资本主义还包括在一种由外交调节的多国文明中竞争的市场、阶级和“有机”的民族国家。欧洲是一个多种权力行为者文明，主要的独立的权力行为者是私有财产所有者，曼称之为“阶级-民族”。【664-5】In this chapter I have shown the interpenetration of the capitalist and national bases of industrialism. The capitalist mode of production, as defined earlier, is a purely economic abstraction. Real-life capitalism, the form of economy that actually triumphed for a time over Europe and the whole globe, actually presupposed, and embedded within itself, other forms of power, especially military and political power. Specifically, along with production, capitalism comprised markets and classes, "organic" national states vying within a diplomatically regulated, multistate civilization. Europe was a multi-power-actor civilization in which the major independent actors were individual property owners and what I termed "class-nations." p.495.

  第十五章 关于欧洲的结论：欧洲动力的解释——资本主义、基督教和国家（European conclusions: explaining European dynamism - capitalism, Christendom, and states）

  前三章将的是欧洲的历史，主题是如何解释欧洲的动力，以及这个动态发展过程中政治权力组织与经济权力组织之间、国家与资本合作以之间的关系，这一章总结。12世纪中期，欧洲是由村庄、庄园和小国家组成的群龙无首的联邦，由基督教的规范绥靖松散地结合在一起。这种早期农业的动态发展逐渐受制于三个更广泛的权力网络：① 资本主义；② 现代有机国家；③ 一种竞争的、由外交调节的多国文明（国家存在于其中）【675；689】[In the mid-twelfth century, Europe consisted of a multiple, acephalous federation of villages, manors, and small states, bound loosely together by the nonnative pacification of Christendom.… They argued that the early agricultural dynamic within a framework of normative pacification became harnessed to three more extensive power networks: (1) capitalism; (2) the modem, organic state; and (3) a competitive, diplomatically regulated multistate civilization in which the state was embedded. p.500.… The second pattern and its impact on medieval Europe were fully discussed in the three preceding chapters. In the medieval era, agricultural-cum-navigational opportunities were exploitable by a historically conjunctural, but internally patterned, set of overlapping power networks. These were (1) the normative pacification of Christendom, later largely replaced by a diplomatically regulated multistate civilization; (2) small, weak political states, growing in centralized-territorial coordinating and organic powers, but never internally or geopolitically hegemonic; and (3) a multiplicity of part-autonomous, competitive, local economic-power networks- peasant communities, lordly manors, towns, and merchant and artisan guilds - whose competition gradually settled into that single, universal, diffuse set of private-property power relations we know as capitalism. By 1477 these power networks were developing into their simpler, modem form: a multistate, capitalist civilization, into whose internal composition we will delve in a moment. p.510.] 这种动态发展不同于工业革命，虽在后者达到顶峰，但是漫长的、或许有些不稳定的积累过程（而非事件），其他事件都不是对欧洲奇迹的概括性解释，它们在历史上出现得太晚，曼确立为1150-1200年。【675-6】反对统一性和单因性解释，比较方法的困难，转向历史叙事。“历史社会学而不是比较社会学始终是我的基本方法”。Historical, not comparative, sociology has been my principal method. p.503. 曼反对把社会变革看成系统变动，看成由某个社会的模式化的紧张、矛盾和创造力在内部造成的变动；而认为许多因素是通过国家之间的地缘政治关系的影响加入进来的，甚至更多因素是通过间隙渠道或超民族渠道而直接管乐各个国家，国家的边界对它们几乎不起什么作用。他关注的并不是某一疆域的连续历史，而是强大社会或文明的“领先优势”的历史。在欧洲，这种领先地位从意大利向西和西北转移，通过中部贸易走廊，转移到西北部的地域性国家，最终转移到英国。【679-680】（Throughout this volume we have repeatedly encountered one major objection to conceiving of social change as systemic, as internally generated by the patterned tensions, contradictions, and creative energies of a given society. It is that the sources of change are geographically and socially "promiscuous" - they do not all emanate from within the social and territorial space of the given "society." Many enter through the influence of geopolitical relations between states; even more flow interstitially or transnationally right through states, taking little notice of their boundaries. These sources of change are heightened in the case of social development. For we are concerned here, not with the continuous history of a given territory, but with the history of "leading edges'' of powerful societies and civilizations, wherever these most advanced edges of power are found. In Europe, the lead traveled northward and westward across the three preceding chapters, from Italy, up the central trade corridors to the territorial states of the northwest and eventually to Great Britain. p.503.）考虑动态发展的核心的地理转移，以及与非欧洲地区的外部关系，两种情况混合在一起。【680】四种权力网络的作用。【684-5】资本主义与国家的相互关系，由财政记录显示英国人国家的职能。【689】国家的权力自主性，为什么能做到这一点？国家提供了领土集中的组织和地缘外交。【693】

  第十六章 农业社会世界历史发展的模式（Patterns of world-historical development in agrarian societies）

  四种权力：（1）意识形态权力，超越性的；【699】内在精神；【700】（2）经济权力，实践环网的手段；【700-1】（3）军事权力，集中强制；【701】（4）政治权力，领土集中，【702】地缘政治外交手段。【703】权力来源的相互关系没有明显的、程式化的一般模式【704】there is no obvious, formulaic, general patterning of the interrelations of power sources. p.523. 世界历史模式，及其限定：社会权力经常似乎是通过偶然的局势发展的，其进程在内部是不平衡的，在地理上也不断地转移。【706】（it often seems to develop through accidental conjuncture, that the process is internally uneven, and that it has been geographically shifty. p.524.）（1）偶然性（it may be world-historical, but it still often feels like accident. It was one process, but only just. p.531.）（2）集体权力的不平衡发展（although in the long run power development may look cumulative, one-directional, and one-dimensional, the actual mechanisms involved have been various and uneven. Let me give a military example. p.532.）两种发展类型的辩证关系：支配性帝国；多种权力行为者的文明【719】（3）地理转移，权利的领先优势在历史上是经常转移的，世界历史的发展不可能采取进化模式。【725】（the leading edge of power has migrated throughout much of history. … Thus there is one further potential pattern that world-historical development cannot assume. p.538.）非进化模式：① 制度化/间隙性以外模式【725】权力的领先优势向西和向西北的转移。【726】指出在第三卷进行更高层次理论概括前，应先描述工业社会的种种模式和偶然事件。【728】

• 算不上书评

  作者：瓣儿 发布时间：2011-11-09 21:54:37

  放在平时，对此类所谓的畅销书是不予理会的。前一阵苏宁搞“零元售书”活动，为了凑单便捎上了这本书，也想看看是怎么个畅销法儿。

  昨天书送到了，略翻了一翻，就知道是什么货色了。今天午饭后又花了两个小时从头至尾浏览了一遍。洋洋洒洒十万余字，故事情节里穿插着一些浅显的心理学知识，比如讲的无非就是自我认知这一件事儿。这样的书能畅销，反映出来的问题是现在太多人缺乏自省的能力。一阵阵的迷茫困惑无处排解，便寄希望于此类“灵丹妙药”。稍微得到点儿启发，就有恍然大悟，醍醐灌顶之感，遂满世界宣传，仿佛发现新大陆。跟着，便有人追捧。

  话说回来，这本书对于从未接触过哲学及心理学的人来说，还算是不错的入门读物。用秋微的话来说，谁年轻的时候没读过几本心灵鸡汤。能通过这本书打开一扇门，也算一件好事。所以，让爱读的人们读去吧。