仓央嘉措情歌集 在线下载 pdf mobi 2025 epub 电子版

《仓央嘉措情歌集》内容简介：仓央嘉措通过这凡尘的烟火来消解自己在佛门的孤寂与寂寞——这是身体和灵魂被束缚、无A可解的寂寞。一个本来想要糖的孩子，可命运给了他很多莲子，诗就从这“富贵”的苦中发出来。在这矛盾中，心灵的笑是诗，哭是诗，处处都透着诗。仓央嘉措的诗便是如此迸发，当然，他的诗歌题材，也不仅仅都是情歌，还有很多歌颂佛教的内容，可见，无论选择什么，都会在灵魂上烙下印记。

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仓央嘉措，六世达赖喇嘛,西藏历史上的著名人物。公元1683年出生于西藏门隅一个农奴家庭。自小被指认为五世达赖的转世，于1697年，在拉萨受坐床礼，成为六世达赖。他其实一直是西藏政治斗争的傀儡，1705年被政敌诬为假达赖，押往北京，去向生死不明，成为一个谜。

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《仓央嘉措情歌集》内容简介：仓央嘉措通过这凡尘的烟火来消解自己在佛门的孤寂与寂寞——这是身体和灵魂被束缚、无A可解的寂寞。一个本来想要糖的孩子，可命运给了他很多莲子，诗就从这“富贵”的苦中发出来。在这矛盾中，心灵的笑是诗，哭是诗，处处都透着诗。仓央嘉措的诗便是如此迸发，当然，他的诗歌题材，也不仅仅都是情歌，还有很多歌颂佛教的内容，可见，无论选择什么，都会在灵魂上烙下印记。

• 作者：噬元兽 发布时间：2022-10-08 07:16:04

  2018

• 作者：微生 发布时间：2020-10-20 16:10:16

  抖音直播四保一大龙世界首杀，s10都没你精彩。

• 作者：椒花颂声 发布时间：2023-10-19 23:14:47

  不如叫段子集，被仓央嘉措这个恋爱脑笑死

• 作者：游牧人·芳汀 发布时间：2018-03-29 21:11:05

  #图书馆#“压根儿没见最好/也省得情思萦绕/原来不熟也好/就不会这般颠倒”没想到内容这么少，所以编辑才加了那么多的自我发挥的诠释长文吧，纯熟画蛇添足，直接略过只看诗歌就好了。诗也就是小学生水平吧可能因为身份特殊才被追捧

• 作者：会飞的诗人 发布时间：2023-07-09 20:50:55

  很短小的诗歌。难得一片赤诚。

• 作者：逃跑和抓捕 发布时间：2022-09-13 16:43:46

  情歌情书很好的

• 产妇饮食建议笔记

  作者：颜禾 发布时间：2020-04-14 10:08:16

  产妇饮食建议

  【需要补充的营养素】

  在我国2014年公布的最新膳食营养素参考值当中，对新妈妈的营养素供应标准是：蛋白质在孕前基础上每天增加25g，钙增加200mg，钾增加400mg，铁增加3mg，锌增加4.5mg，维生素A增加600μg，维生素B1和B2均增加0.3mg，维生素C增加50mg。叶酸的建议增加量比孕期略低，从200μg降低到130μg，但仍然比孕前数量增加，继续服用叶酸片或复合维生素片是有益无害的。

  按照《中国居民膳食指南（2016）》中的哺乳期妇女膳食标准，哺乳妈妈的一日食物建议量大致是：谷类250～300g（其中杂粮不少于50g），薯类75g。蔬菜至少500g，其中深绿色和红橙黄色的蔬菜占2/3以上；水果200～400g，鱼、禽、蛋、瘦肉（含动物内脏）总量220g；牛奶400～500ml，大豆类25g，坚果10g，烹调油25g，食盐5g。为了保证维生素A和铁的供给量，最好每周吃1～2次动物肝脏，比如85g猪肝或40g鸡肝。其中禽类的肝脏中维生素A含量更为丰富，而且口感更细腻。

  月子食物：能量供应需求并不高，多样又不过量，重点在增加微量营养素上

  保证母乳：需保证蛋白质、钙、B族维生素

  增加富含优质蛋白质及维生素A的动物性食物和海产品，选用碘盐。

  除了吃碘盐之外，还建议每周吃两次海产品，比如海鱼、海贝和海带之类。

  为了自己的骨骼健康，哺乳妈妈最好能够额外服用含维生素D的营养补充品。（？）

  哺乳期妈妈和孕期准妈妈的DHA供应标准一样，所以只需要参照孕期的做法，每周吃2～3次鱼就足够好了，不一定要服用鱼油或藻油类产品。

  补钙：每天摄入500g奶类这一点，牛奶、酸奶、奶粉（500g奶粉=3500～4000g鲜奶）均可，此外还要多吃绿叶蔬菜和豆制品，可以达到1000mg钙的推荐量。如果做不到这些，那么每天补充400mg钙是比较理想的。可以考虑分两次补充，每次200mg，在吃饭或吃水果的时候一起服用最好，不要空腹吃。水果中的有机酸有利于碳酸钙的利用。

  要得到维生素C和叶酸，吃足够的蔬菜水果就好了。每天500g蔬菜、250g新鲜水果是不可少的，特别是绿叶蔬菜，是叶酸的最佳来源。

  要得到维生素B1，主要靠各种杂粮、杂豆和薯类。精白米中的维生素B1是最少的，而吃杂粮饭、八宝粥和土豆红薯之类就比较容易把维生素B1吃足。比如说，小米中的维生素B1含量是精白大米的5倍；糙米中的维生素B1含量是精白大米的3倍。即便减掉20％的饭量，只要把主食从白米换成杂粮，维生素的供应量就会有增无减。

  维生素B2的好来源是奶类、蛋黄和牛肉。吃蒸煮的蛋、低脂的奶、不加油的酱牛肉，就足以获得这些营养。和精白米比起来，各种杂粮的维生素B2含量也会高出1～3倍。

  哺乳期需要增加奶类、豆制品、蔬菜和水果，需要用杂粮、杂豆、薯类替代一部分白米饭，需要适当吃点肉类、鱼类和蛋类，但并不需要每天吃进去大量脂肪。即便不喝乳白色的高脂肪汤，不吃排骨和肥牛，甚至炒菜放油很少，也完全不妨碍泌乳。

  【具体饮食建议】

  分娩当天：不建议巧克力

  建议：早餐谷物脆片（含多种维生素）、脂肪含量低的面包、芝麻糊粉等可以随时冲糊的淀粉类食物、复合B族维生素片、牛奶、含电解质的运动饮料

  产后1～2天：

  顺产：易消化的半流食和柔软食物，比如红枣肉小米粥、南瓜红薯丁糙米粥、醪糟蛋花汤、番茄蛋汤龙须面、蒸苹果、蛋羹、煮鹌鹑蛋或鸽蛋、鸡汤青菜叶小馄饨、暖到体温的酸奶、用豆浆机打的坚果糯米红小豆糊糊等。

  剖宫产之后1～2天内，也以吃容易消化的流食、半流食为宜，两天内不要吃容易产生胀气的牛奶、豆浆等食物，也不要吃添加大量糖的食物和过咸的食物。

  3～4天之后，新妈妈消化能力恢复，就可以正常进食了。

  尽早给产妇供应煮烂的青菜叶、煮软的薯类和蒸熟的水果很有好处，因为柔软的膳食纤维有利于大肠的正常运动，防止新妈妈发生便秘

  多吃杂粮

  主食大部分用杂粮。每天早饭1碗牛奶冲燕麦片，加上蒸甘薯或蒸土豆；中午是大米小米饭；晚上喝两碗浓稠的杂粮豆粥，里面有小米、糙米、燕麦片、红小豆、花芸豆、芝麻、莲子等。

  晚餐把白米、白面换成杂粮、杂豆煮成的八宝粥，推荐优先用小米、燕麦、红豆、黑米等食材。

  补血食物：如红枣、红糖、猪肝等。

  催乳食物：如仔鸡、黄豆、猪蹄、花生、木瓜

  牛奶枣肉南瓜糊1杯。原料：蒸南瓜150g，牛奶100g，枣肉30g。做法：南瓜蒸熟（可以和茄子一起蒸），去皮取肉，放入打浆机中，加牛奶和去核的枣肉，一起打成糊即可。

  酸奶最好选择无糖品种，如果没有，则选碳水化合物含量低于11.0％的产品。

• Could Self-Evidence Guarantee Objectivity of Basic Values?

  作者：法妹儿 发布时间：2017-09-29 11:43:05

  Could Self-Evidence Guarantee Objectivity of Basic Values?

  In

  Natural Law and Natural Right

  , John Finnis outlines basic values and principles as contents of his natural law theory. The principal characteristic of them is so-called self-evidence, through which these basic values or principles are not subjective or arbitrary, but objective.[1] This essay would crystalize this thesis. The first part would rephrase Finnis’s arguments, and then would be a comparison between Finnis’s and Cartesian epistemology. The third part would be a short conclusion that Finnis fails because there is no mind-independent objectivity as such.

  I.

  Trying to defeat all skeptical assertions, Finnis makes a distinction between discourse about natural law and discourse about a doctrine or doctrines of natural law.[2] The theory he puts up with is about natural law, rather than doctrine or doctrines of it,[3] seeming to provide a more advanced and stable basis for natural law. This basis Finnis grounds all his theory on is that natural law is eternal and without history, but we human beings within history could grasp it. For the reason that natural law is eternal and beyond our history, it is objective; and because we could grasp it, it could have an effect on our daily life, rather than a castle in the air. This is his core thesis that the self-evidence of basic values could guarantee the objectivity.

  However, a kind of paradox is surely here: how could someone within history grasp something beyond history, and how could someone make sure that she has grasped it? Or put it in epistemological terms, how could Finnis bridge the gap between a cognitive subject who could only know something mind-dependent and something mind-independent to be known?

  Finnis’s answer is quite easy: basic values, as contents of natural law, are so self-evident that we could grasp them directly without hesitation,[4] and because of their self-evidence, basic values are indemonstrable.[5] Here we could conclude the self-evidence plays two roles in Finnis’s theory. The one is Finnis connects the knower and the known in the epistemological sense and protects the objectivity of basic values from history or subjective opinions. The other is through it, Finnis’s theory could avoid the critique from the Humean distinction between

  is

  and

  ought

  , because natural law would not come from facts, but from these indemonstrable and irrefutable basic values.[6]

  Through the analysis above, there is a strong tendency in Finnis’s theory that he tries to ground his natural law theory on a necessarily true basis (the first principle), from which he could deduce the whole system. Thus, his theory is also a variation of foundationalism in epistemology, which combining with his attempt to grasp the mind-independent reality, shares the same theoretical aim with Descartes we turn to below.

  II.

  Descartes, the founding father of modern philosophy and a notorious skeptic, is faced with the same problems as Finnis, but adapts different strategies. This part would first give an outline of Cartesian argumentation on how someone could grasp mind-independent reality and then compare his theory with Finnis’s.

  What perplexes Descartes is how we could justify what we know is what really is, not what seems to be for us.[7] The famous example is, when we see a table, how could we say it really is a table, rather than something evil deceiving us?[8] This problematic is quite similar with the paradox Finnis trying to solve as what we have argued.

  Descartes’ strategy, however, is rather different from Finnis’s. Finnis tends to adapt a kind of intuitionalism, originating from Plato’s intellectual intuition to grasp

  eidos

  . Cartesian epistemology is a kind of representationalism, in which there would be what represents and what is represented. Clear and distinct ideas would represent what really is or mind-independent reality in Descartes’ theory. His argumentation is as follows:

  (1) There are clear and distinct ideas that I know[9];

  (2) These clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true[10];

  (3) Through these clear and distinct ideas, I would get to know what really is, not what seems to be;

  (4) Why couldn’t these clear and distinct ideas deceive me?

  (5) These clear and distinct ideas come from God, which would not deceive us.[11]

  In this way, Descartes could say,

  I think, therefore I am

  , because clear and distinct ideas could not come from our sensation which could distort reality or be deceived, but come from our intellectual connection with God. The reason he develops this different strategy is, from his view, we could not trust our sensation as Aristotle has said (which is the deep root of Finnis’s theory[12]). Thus, this

  cogito

  or

  I think

  , is the supreme principle of Descartes’ theory, from which all his justification of our knowledge could be deduced.[13] In this sense, although Descartes doesn’t accept Aristotle’s justification of knowledge, he totally agrees with Aristotle’s definition of knowledge or science, which is to grasp the first principle, from which deductive inference proceeds.[14]

  Through a general outline of Cartesian epistemology, there exist two different points from Finnis’s. The one is obvious that we could not grasp mind-independent reality directly, but indirectly, namely through mediation (clear and distinct ideas). The other is implicit or presupposed by the former that only through a cognitive subject could we get to know the object. To put it in another way, the knower, as the first principle in his theory, would play a role in our cognition of the known. The first principle, in Cartesian theory, is the

  cogito

  , a thinking being; but in Finnis’s, it would be basic values without thinking (otherwise, basic values would be not so self-evident). Thus, concerning the epistemological gap between the subject and object, both Descartes’ and Finnis’s theory are variations of foundationalism, but have different even opposite attitudes towards intuition or sensation. Is Finnis right, in Descartes’ wake?

  III.

  To evaluate these two strategies, a proper way is to analyze their theoretical ambitions. As what has repeated again and again, Finnis tries to guarantee the objectivity of natural law through the self-evidence of basic values. In Descartes’ wake, the advantages and disadvantages of this strategy could be understood much more clearly. This part would describe its advantages first, and then provides a critical analysis of its disadvantages.

  By and through the self-evidence of basic values, Finnis unfolds to us someone conditioned in history could grasp natural law beyond it. Without doubt, Finnis agrees with Thomas Aquinas that while some propositions are self-evident to ‘everyone’, other proposition are self-evident only to ‘the wise’.[15] Thus, he would admit a Platonic theory that only someone by nature and nurture through could grasp

  eidos

  through intuition as what has mentioned above. This further means some principle of natural law or basic values, although they are self-evident, they may not be so self-evident to everyone. They may appear to someone, and disappear to others, but what appears and disappears would be the same. Thus, there is no need for a kind of mediation to represent what disappears to us.

  Compared with the Cartesian strategy, Finnis’ theory has at least one advantage. In Descartes’ theory, he distinguishes between what represents and what is represented. The core issue he would deal with is, how he could guarantee or justify what represents accurately corresponds to what is represented. That is the reason why Descartes introduces God into his theory: God would not deceive us and those clear and distinct ideas from it would justify this correspondence. However, in a more secular world, Descartes’ strategy would be a metaphor to tell us his theory could just assume, but not justify the correspondence between the two. Finnis’s theory, instead, intentionally or unintentionally avoids this problem because he doesn’t make the distinction as Descartes, and in fact equals what appears with what disappears.

  Nonetheless, Finnis’s theory has two fatal disadvantages. The first disadvantage, as Descartes’ famous example says, certainty, however self-evident, is quite different from knowledge, which aims at pursuing what really is.[16] The self-evidence could not function as this criterion to discern what seems to be and what really is on one hand, and Finnis could not provide other ways for us to detect what we grasp is what really is on the other hand. If he could, it would mean his basic values need demonstration or justification. What surely could be deduced is there may be a higher principle behind basic values, which would lead to infinitive regression.

  The second disadvantage follows from the first. If we accept certainty is different from what really is, then we would also accept the gap between mind-independence and mind-dependence has not been bridged through Finnis’s strategy. This deep gulf should be taken seriously for double reasons. On one hand, it means the attempt of Finnis to grasp something beyond history by someone conditioned in history would thoroughly fail, because of no criterion for Finnis to justify or demonstrate what is self-evident is what really is. On the other hand, it would stop the argumentation from self-evidence to objectivity of basic values. If we could not discern accurately what is self-evident from what really is, we have to distinguish self-evidence from objectivity, too. Besides, when we take into consideration the fact that Finnis’s theory is a variation of foundationalism, these two disadvantages would be fatal because all his system is based on the so-called self-evident, objective and indemonstrable basic values, which by and through critical analysis, may be merely self-evident, but not objective. Some scholars would oppose this argument that the definition of objectivity here is too exclusive. Objectivity could not only include what really is, but also a kind of agreement or assent within a community. This opinion is incompatible with Finnis’s theory because while he emphasizes the self-evidence of basic values that someone could grasp directly, he doesn’t assume a kind of consensus for the reason that he also admits someone could not grasp these values easily as others.

  Through the analysis above, we could clearly say these two characteristics of the beginning of Finnis’s theory, namely self-evidence (objectivity) and foundationalism, can be fatal to his whole system in a sense. The nerve here is, if Finnis only upholds the self-evidence or objectivity of basic values, and gives up foundationalism, his disability to justify the objectivity could not be so fatal as now to his theory, because a sound and reasonable theory could also be one, within which all propositions would underpin each other, constitute a coherent whole and with the development of argumentation, this coherence and explanatory power of theory would develop, too. But as Finnis combines the self-evidence with foundationalism, his standpoints would be so strong that they success once for all and fail hand in hand. Unluckily, through what has analyzed, Finnis could not justify the mind-independent objectivity of basic values as such, he has to accept his theory has a fatal shortcoming.[17]

  [1] John Finnis,

  Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edition)

  , Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 64-65.

  [2] Id, p. 25.

  [3] Id.

  [4] Finnis cited Julius Stone and Aquinas to explain his idea. Id, pp. 31-32.

  [5] Id, p. 33.

  [6] In this way, Finnis rejects a classical critique that natural law is kind of theory deducing

  ought

  from

  is

  . This is a prospective defense shared by many other scholars in the field of constitutional interpretation. For example, Ronald Dworkin and James Fleming, they each advocate a kind of interpretation based on legal principles or a moral reading of constitution, claiming, say, to help a person in need is not out of the fact itself, but some moral conviction within our life. This strategy would provide judges a more flexible or pragmatic interpretation of legal texts.

  [7] Rene Descartes,

  Meditations on First Philosophy

  , Michael Moriarty trans, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 13-14.

  [8] Id, p. 17.

  [9] Id, p. 25, 28. Descartes distinguishes two kinds of ideas. One kind represents things outside of ourselves, but they would not necessarily do so. The other kind of ideas is derived from some notions innate within us.

  [10] In fact, clear and distinct, these two words are used by Descartes in his last Meditation. Id, p. 55.

  [11] Id, pp. 38-39.

  [12] Generally speaking, in Book VI of

  Nicomachean Ethics

  , Aristotle’s conception of science provides a basic frame of Finnis’s work. For example, they both share the view that science is aimed to grasp something eternal and necessary; they both think through sensation or experience or induction, we could also get to the eternal or necessary.

  [13] In the Second Meditation, Descartes says, “Archimedes claimed, that if only he had a point that was firm and immovable, he would move the whole earth and great things are likewise to be hoped, if I can find just one little thing that is certain and unshakeable”. See Id, p. 17.

  [14] Aristotle, Book VI, in his

  Nicomachean Ethics

  , Roger Crisp trans, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 104

  [15] John Finnis,

  Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edition)

  , Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 32.

  [16] This issue is so perplexed that at the beginning of analytic philosophy in the early twentieth century, Wittgenstein also expresses the same anxiety in his

  On Certainty

  , in which he shows to us the certainty of sensation is a kind of private, not public, knowledge.

  [17] Finnis refutes his theory has fatal shortcomings and in his

  Postscript

  of

  Natural Law and Natural Rights

  , he says, “…the book has significant weaknesses. But its main purposes and main positions remain intact”. John Finnis,

  Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edition)

  , Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 425.